

From: Mark Clark

Sent: Thursday, 4 June 2020 2:21 PM

To: Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee <pccc@parliament.qld.gov.au>

Subject: Re: Foreign Influence leading to corruption in Government and the Bureaucracy

Hi

Yes. My concern is that there is now another dimension to corruption that was perhaps not envisaged in 1989.

I am concerned that the CCC is not adequately resourced and funded to counter this new dimension to its original mandate.

The matter of the University of Queensland gives rise to the prospect that the external power dimension has institutionalised its corruptive influence in that university.

This may be larger than the single issue of the aggrieved student and beyond the current resources and powers of the CCC to deal with.

My concerns are not with the exercise of its concurrent functions and powers, but rather the adaptation needed to prevent a new dimension of corruption occurring.

The nuanced approach to commercialism and lobbying may be mere window dressing for corruptive practices. Unchecked by effective countermeasures, the public governmental infrastructure may become a hollowed hive of focussed corruption for a foreign power. The governance of the state then is funded by Australians and Queenslanders but working for foreign interests.

Reliance on ASIO and the AFP to protect state governance and infrastructure is an abrogation of state responsibility.

I hope this explains my view and the intended submission.

Yours faithfully,
Mark Clark

From: Mark Clark

Sent: Tuesday, 2 June 2020 5:19 PM

To: Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee <pccc@parliament.qld.gov.au>

Subject: Foreign Influence leading to corruption in Government and the Bureaucracy

Hi

While no doubt that the Crime Corruption Commission is fully able to investigate the forms of corruption envisaged the findings of the Fitzgerald Royal Commission in 1989, how is equipped to deal with issues of corruption rising from agents of influence from foreign powers?

ASIO had strongly stated that foreign agents of influence are heavily committed to penetrating the governance and bureaucracy of this country. There is every reason to believe that these agents are highly skilled in the nuances of corruption and well financed. It is difficult to believe that standard procedures and investigative skills will be enough to deal with this pernicious corruptive attack on the integrity of governance in this state.

What resources has the CCC committed to deal with this ASIO identified corruption risk? Has it the requisite skills in place to deal with a skilled and funded adversary? What agreements does it have in place with federal agencies, such as ASIO? What preventative education has been undertaken by the CCC to counter this practice? What does the CCC do when it uncovers an agent of influence? Has it launched any investigations or prosecutions in this discrete area of corruption?

How would it view the university suspension of Drew Pavlou? In particular, the subsequent intervention by the Chancellor, Mr Varghese, and the assertion by Mr Pavlou that Chinese State Media had instructed the University to suspend him. Is the fact that the Brisbane Chinese Consul General Xu Jie serves as an Honorary Professor evidence on undue influence? I note that the Confucius Institute has funded Beijing approved courses at the university. What is the CCC views on the fact that Sweden has specifically prevented this institute operating in that country because of its corruptive and propagandist intentions?

Does the CCC develop and keep intelligence on agents of influence? Does vetting take place in respect of government contracts and business to ensure that agents of influence have not been involved and corrupted the process? If not, why not?

Yours faithfully,

Mark Clark