Submission 083

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# Submission:

**The New Local Government Electoral Act:** 

Review of the Local Government Electoral System (excluding BCC)

David Spearritt

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# **Abbreviations Used**

AEC	Australian Electoral Commission
CEO	Chief Executive Officer (of the Council)
ECQ	Electoral Commission of Queensland
FPTP	First Past the Post voting systems
LGAQ	Local Government Association of Queensland
MMP	Mixed-Member Proportional voting systems
PR	Proportional Representation
QTC	Queensland Treasury Corporation
STV	Single Transferrable Vote
SBRC	South Burnett Regional Council



## 1. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission into the Committee's Review of Local Government Electoral systems. The opinions expressed in this Submission are personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of any client, including those mentioned in the submission as examples for specific issues.

I, David Spearritt and ORION Consulting Network have been involved in Local Government since 1978. Since 2001, I have provided consulting services to a large proportion of Councils in Queensland, and well as Queensland Government Departments on Local Government matters. I was appointed by the government to monitor Douglas Shire Council and the report was tabled in Parliament. I was also recently appointed by the government as Business Coach to South Burnett Regional Council. I am the former Deputy Local Government Commissioner and in that role led the research project by the Office of Local Government Commissioner into electoral arrangements. Throughout a 30 year Local Government career, I have formed the view that many problems in Local Government can be traced to Governance issues.

Local Government electoral systems are fundamental to the effectiveness of the Local Government system of government, since the elected Councillors govern the Local Government. In some Councils, as few as five Councillors form the Council and make the decisions which impact on many aspects of their community's daily lives. This is the only type of organisation where decision-makers who affect a community's daily lives can immediately be elevated to positions of power. In State and Federal Governments, the elected members normally experience years of party political and parliamentary processes before they are likely to achieve any significant decision-making power. Similarly, in the private sector, it is rare for anyone to achieve a position of real power in any significant organisation without years of experience in that industry.

Therefore, it is imperative that Local Government electoral processes encourage its most able citizens to become candidates for election, and that the best candidates are elected. Other issues such as administrative efficiency of the election process are considerably less important.

I propose the following fundamental principles should apply:

- Electoral Processes should maximise the proportion of the community who exercise their vote, by removing impediments to voting; and
- Electoral Process should ensure that the candidates elected are representative of the voters' wishes.

According to the Local Government Reform Commission Report, the recent amalgamations led to a reduction of the number of Councillors in Queensland from 1250 to 526. These figures exclude Brisbane. Including Brisbane, there would have been a reduction in the number of Councillors in Queensland from 1273 and 553 respectively. Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) data shows that in 2001 and 2004 there were 2.1 candidates per position, which would equate to approximately 2675 candidates. In 2008, this ratio had increased to 2.95 candidates per position, but there were only 1634 candidates. This represents a reduction of over 60 percent in the total number of candidates standing for Local Government election. Therefore, the Local Government Reform has led to greater competition for each Councillor position, but over 1000 less candidates across the State. This dramatic change has several implications.

Firstly, the significantly reduced number of Councillors, who are now responsible for much larger Councils creates a greater need for the system to attract the best candidates. Secondly, the electoral system needs to be highly representative of the Local Government area. In both of these matters the electoral system has not kept pace with these challenges.



## 2. Council Divisions

#### 2.1 Electoral Divisions

Question 1. Are the procedures for the division of Council adequate?

Question 2. If the procedures for the division of Councils are not adequate, what changes are required?

Question 3: Are the error margins of 10% in local government areas with more than 10,000 electors and 20% in all other cases sufficient?

Question 4. Should the mix of divided and undivided councils remain? If so, should the decision to divide a local government area remain with individual councils?

Question 5. Are there other matters the Committee should consider in regard to local government divisions?

State and Federal electoral divisions are determined by independent processes. Local Government electorates in Queensland have traditionally been largely determined by Councils themselves, subject to some oversight by a State agency such as ECQ. However, although the Issues Paper implies that the decision to divide a Local Government lies with Councils, this has not been the case in recent years. There are examples such as Bowen Shire Council which had its proposal to become undivided overridden because of a few objections to the Electoral Commission. In the most recent election, some amalgamating Council's desire for multi-member Divisions were overridden, for example Longreach Regional Council. Therefore the current situation is unsatisfactory with matters which are so fundamental to the democratic process can be determined in a somewhat ad hoc manner.

Local Government Reform resulted in the amalgamation of Councils in communities which were near urbanised parts of Queensland. This makes the issue of the format of the electoral divisions much more complex. For example, Toowoomba Regional Council was formed by the amalgamation of seven Shire Councils and Toowoomba City Council. The new Council was elected on an undivided basis even though the resultant electorate is larger in area and population that the State and Federal electorates in the area. Nevertheless, the election resulted in at least one Councillor being elected from each of the eight former Councils, and forming what has become a highly functional Council. Single member divisions would have quaranteed at least six of the Councillors would have represented the Toowoomba city area, and the seven former Shire areas would have needed to Share the remaining three or four divisions. By contrast, Moreton Bay Regional Council was formed by the amalgamation of two very large Shires (Pine Rivers and Caboolture) and the smaller Redcliffe City. The election was based on single member divisions, and has resulted in a good level of representation across the community and a cohesive Council has operated since inception. The implication is that one size or approach does not suit all circumstances, and there are sound reasons for each Council to have a substantial say in the electoral arrangements for its community.

One option would be to remove from Councils the power to determine their electoral divisions. It would also overcome any objections that Councillors have a vested interest in determining their electoral boundaries. Furthermore, this would be in keeping with the practice for State and Federal elections. However, it is unlikely that such a centralised, albeit independent, process could cater for the complexity and diversity of situations across the Local Government's in Queensland. It is likely to result in standardisation of divisional approaches as has been suggested from time to time (eg, undivided Councils up to a

certain size, and single-member divisions for all larger Councils). Therefore I do not support such a move.

Another option would be to allow Councils to make their own determinations without any oversight, however there would inevitably be allegations of vested interests being pursued.

My preferred approach would be to require each Council to formally formulate and adopt its electoral policies and objectives, and then to propose alternative electoral options to meet those policies and objectives and then seek community input. For example, a valid electoral policy would be to ensure that smaller communities would be likely to be represented. If the Council proposes to change its electoral arrangements (single member, multi-member or undivided) it would then be required to consult the community and make a formal submission to the electoral commission to make a proposed determination. This proposed determination should then be on public display and submissions for 30 days, before final determination would be made by the Commission. This would provide a balance between addressing local issues and create a degree of independence from Councillors with obvious vested interests making the final determination.

The three options of single member, multi-member and undivided Councils should remain, as this allows for Councils to address the diversity of complex situations across the Councils in Queensland. As noted above, even a very large Council such as Toowoomba Regional Council with around 160,000 population, has become a highly effective and functional Council with an undivided Council.

The 10 and 20 percent electoral tolerances appear to have become well accepted over the last two decades. However it is somewhat ironic that Councils with more than 10,000 electors tend to be in higher growth areas than those with under 10,000 electors. With four year terms it is virtually inevitable that Councils experiencing growth will need to amend their electoral boundaries for each quadrennial election. In other words, the practical justification for greater error margins seems to be with the larger growing Councils than for the smaller Councils. This makes it difficult to develop single-member divisions which reflect communities of interest.



### 3. Conduct of Elections

#### 3.1 Responsible Body

Question 6. Should the Electoral Commission of Queensland be responsible for the administration of the quadrennial local government elections or should this responsibility remain with Council CEOs?

Question 7. If the ECQ is to be responsible for local government elections should the new Act allow more flexibility in regard to the conduct of the quadrennial elections than the current Act does? If so, how?

In our view, this choice should be a matter for each Local Government CEO, with the option available for the CEO of the Council to appoint the ECQ to conduct the election. There have been complaints that the ECQ was more expensive and bureaucratic that previous arrangements, and therefore ECQ should not have a monopoly over this service provision. Many Councils have found the most effective option has been to appoint an experienced, independent Returning Officer to conduct the election. The option of appointing ECQ should be available but not mandatory.

The Issues Paper notes a recommendation from Mr Becker of the AEC that future quadrennial elections should be conducted to ensure absolute impartiality and integrity. However, there is no evidence that previous elections conducted by parties other than the ECQ were not impartial or lacked integrity. The stringent electoral laws ensure that any impartiality or lack of integrity would be open to challenge in the courts.



#### 3.2 Timing

Question 8. Is the time for the close of the rolls and the date of the elections appropriate?

Question 9. What changes, if any, should be made to the timing of local government elections?

The following table compares the closing dates for the Rolls for the current Federal Election (including a half Senate election) and Queensland Local Government. Even though the Queensland Local Government elections are on a planned date unlike the State and Federal Elections, the lead times between the close of the Rolls and the date of the election is around double for the Local Government elections compared with State and Federal Elections (55 to 60 days for Local Government, compared to 30 days for the Federal Election.

Event	Federal Election Date	Days from Close of Roll	Queensland Local Government	Queensland Local Government days
Announcement	17 July			
Issue of Writ	19 July			
Deadline for new enrolments	19 July			
Deadline to Update Roll	22 July	0	31 January	0
Election Day	21 August	30	Last Saturday in March	31 March 2012 (60 days) 26 March 2016 (55 days)
				28 March 2020 (57 days)

#### 3.2.1 Closing of the Rolls

As noted in the Issues Paper, the current arrangement allows approximately eight weeks from the close of the rolls until the conduct of the election. This is approximately double that for State and Federal Elections. Moreover, the Local Government election have a fixed date, whereas most State and Federal elections are dependent on the announcement by the Premier or Prime Minister. Therefore the Electoral Commission has greater ability to plan for the preparation of Local Government electoral rolls than for the State and Federal elections in Queensland. The earlier closing of the rolls in Local Government creates a greater risk of electing Councils which are less representative of their communities than would be possible with a later closing time. Groups most likely to be adversely affected by the early closing would be youth and new residents. Both of these groups are most likely to be busy during January (youth in looking for their first job or commencing tertiary studies) and new residents often relocate during the January school holiday period). Therefore, there seems to be a strong case for the electoral rolls closing towards the end of February.



#### 3.2.2 March or October Election Date

The timing of Council elections has been subject to considerable debate over a number of years. The main complaint of the current timing is that newly elected Councils are required to immediately prepare their first budget under the current timing. Many Councillors have complained that this timing is unreasonable and that elections should be conducted in October. While this argument appears to be sensible at first glance, it does not withstand scrutiny.

Councils are elected in late March and the declaration of the Polls usually occurs in late March or April. Under Local Government legislation, Councils have until the end of August to adopt their budgets, some five months after the Council elections. Recently I was appointed by the government to be Business Coach to the South Burnett Regional Council (SBRC). SBRC had an operating deficit which was nearly 14 percent of its operating revenues, and this was clearly unsustainable. As Business Coach, I provided a report to the Council in late April 2010. This report recommended a range of revenue, expenditure and operational efficiencies which could be changed to rectify its budgetary problems, as well as a decision-making budget process to assist making the tough decisions. These options involved difficult decisions which were unlikely to face most newly elected Councils. Nevertheless, the Council applied itself and was able to adopt a budget with a 4 percent operating surplus in late July 2010. This was a 20 percent change in the net operating result, which is a very significant change. The solution to the timing constraint for adopting the first Council budget is to develop an effective budget process, not a delay in the election. It would be expected that Council officers would prepare a basic draft budget with a range of options prior to the Council election. The Council's role is to make policy decisions about budget priorities, not to prepare all of the budget calculations and review every budget detailed item.

A significant downside of an October election is that the new Council would need to administer the previous Council's budget for two thirds of the first year, and this represents one sixth of its four year term. Another real danger is that the outgoing Council would have an incentive to adopt an unsustainable or unrealistic budget, since it would only need to operate for a few months under the new budget before facing the electorate.



### Candidates

#### 4.1 Eligibility

Question 10. Is the nomination process adequate? Why?

Question 11. Does the current system encourage a diverse range of candidates to stand?

Question 12. Should a candidate be required to live in the local government area in which they stand for election?

Question 13. Should a councillor be required to live in the local government area for their whole four year term?

Question 14. Should a person be able to stand as a dual candidate for both mayor and councillor?

Question 15. Should the new Act allow mayors to be appointed by their fellow councillors?

The most important priorities are to ensure that Councillors are as representative as possible and that there is a high level of competition to ensure that the best candidates are elected. Some restrictions on nominations may be necessary to ensure that frivolous candidates are discouraged. The current nomination process seems to strike a reasonable balance so as to achieve these objectives.

However, other aspects of the current system discourage or prevent some of the most eligible candidates from running for election. The requirement for local or state candidates to resign before standing for election at the other level of government definitely hinders some of the most eligible candidates from standing, therefore this provision should be removed.

Similarly, the requirement that a candidate cannot stand for the position of Mayor and Councillor creates a form of Russian roulette, and discourages some of the most experienced candidates from standing for Mayor. Although such competition could be disruptive towards the end of a Council term, the political process is necessarily competitive. Again, this restriction should be removed. It would simply mean that the Mayoral election would need to be counted first.

In the interests of representation, a Councillor should be required to live in the Local Government area for the whole four year term.

I strongly support the continuation of direct election of Mayors, which results in the strong Mayor system of Local Government, and has a long and successful history in Queensland Local Government. However the Local Government Act could be modified so that the powers of the directly elected Mayor are partly determined by the elected Council. If the Mayor has the support of the Council, wide powers could be delegated to the Mayor (akin to those of the Brisbane Mayor), whereas if no extra powers were delegated, the role would fulfil the minimum statutory roles and be largely ceremonial in nature. This would allow the role of the Mayor to adapt to different circumstances and levels of support. This would be preferable to having the Mayor elected by the fellow Councillors.

#### 4.2 Campaign Funding

Question 16. Are the requirements for disclosure of campaign funding sufficient?

Question 17. Should candidates make disclosures before, progressively during, and after an election period?

Question 18. Should all disclosure requirements, such as values, disclosure periods and who must comply, be standardised?

Question 19. Should particular fundraising activities for local government elections be prohibited?

One of the disadvantages of the limited use of political parties in Local Government in Queensland is that electoral fund raising often has to be conducted by the candidate rather than at arms length by a political party. This problem has been greatly exacerbated by the recent large amalgamation of already large Councils. A single letterbox drop for a Mayor or a Councillor elected at large in a large Council is likely to be beyond the financial capacity of individual candidates, necessitating some degree of fund raising. This in itself discourages some of the best potential candidates, and creates potential conflicts of interest for those that use fund raising. Donors would often have an expectation of receiving favourable approvals, even if this is not offered by a candidate.

An alternative, not canvassed in the Issues Paper, would be for a degree of public funding for election campaigns. For example, all candidates could be entitled to one mailed brochure of a certain standard and format which would be printed and posted at Council expense. Similarly, basic how-to-vote cards for all candidates could be printed at Council cost. Another option would be to place an advertisement in all newspapers circulating in the area, with a photograph and paragraph supplied by each candidate. Reducing the need for campaign funding is preferable to controls over that funding and subsequent conflicts of interest. My experience is that the most effective processes are those which it make it easier for people to do the right thing, and harder to do the wrong thing, so that the incentives are towards the desired behaviour. Merely controlling campaign funding without reducing the need for candidates to spend considerable funds to get their message out to the community would create an in-built tension which would lead to inevitable breaches.

Even with the above suggestions, controls would be needed over disclosure of campaign funding. These should ideally be consistent with those for State candidates and Members of Parliament.



#### 4.3 Promotional Material

Question 20. Should how-to-vote cards be free from promotional content?

Question 21. Should how-to-vote cards be standard for all candidates? If so, should these be provided in all polling booths and postal vote packs by the Electoral Commission of Queensland?

Question 22. What promotional material, such as bunting (continuous signage) and coreflutes, should be allowed during the campaign period and at polling booths on election day?

Question 23. Should the placement and amount of election campaign material be standard across all local government areas?

Question 24. Should a 'media blackout' period apply for local government elections? Why? For how long?

Question 21 seems to pre-empt that the ECQ will be conducting the elections. However, providing standard electoral material would support my comments above (Questions 16-19) in reducing the need for campaign funding. Nevertheless, this process should be independent of any decision as to who is appointed by the CEO to conduct the election.

Controls over the placement of campaign and promotional material are really matters of visual amenity, and this will vary greatly across the State. These matters are better left to individual Local Government's in determining advertising controls, and this is already within their current powers.

Currently media blackouts only apply in State and Federal elections to the electronic media. Most Local Government electoral campaigns are conducted through the print media, and therefore this is likely to be a non issue. However it may be wise to ensure that the requirements are consistent with State electoral requirements.



## 5. Voting

#### 5.1 Compulsory Voting

Question 25. Should voting remain compulsory for local government elections in Queensland?

Yes. The experience in jurisdictions without compulsory voting in Local Government elections is that voter turnout is as low as 20 to 30 percent if it is not compulsory. Such low levels do not augur well for the representativeness of the elected Council, nor the credibility of Local Government in general. The current system of largely unenforced compulsory voting results in around 80 percent voter turnout, and seems to strike the right balance.

Australians appear to have long accepted the need for compulsory voting, and this is an area where Local Government elections should be consistent with State and Federal elections. Voter turnout in states where Local Government elections are not compulsory often achieve less than 50 percent voter turnout. It is important for the credibility of Local Government and the elected Council to be able to able to demonstrate that they are representative of the community and have been elected by a substantial proportion of the community.

#### 5.2 Postal Voting

Question 26. Should the option of a postal vote be extended to all voters in every area?

Question 27. Should a full postal ballot be automatic for some local government areas? If so, why and for which areas?

Question 28. Should the criteria for pre-polling and postal voting be abolished?

Question 29. Does the restriction on voters to attend only polling booths in a division in which they are enrolled adversely affect voters? If this were altered what impact would that have on the administration of the elections in that local government?

Question 30. Should the new Act allow absent voting? If so, should this be restricted to absent voting within a local government area only?

These questions seem to reflect a tradeoff between administrative efficiency and costs, versus making it easy for electors to exercise their vote. Ideally, this balance should be towards encouraging voting so that the elected Council is as representative of its community as possible. Question 26 canvasses the option of allowing postal voting to be extended to all voters in every area. This would enhance voting opportunities and encourage voting, and as such is supported. However, the converse also applies. Many Councils only offer the option of postal voting, and this tends to disenfranchise itinerant electors, and those with limited literacy. In particular, indigenous communities appear to be disenfranchised by postal-only ballots. One Council has an indigenous community of over one quarter of its population, yet no representatives from that community. The option of voting in person should be provided in all towns in a Local Government area.



#### 5.3 Property Franchise

Question 31. Should the right to vote in Queensland local government elections be extended to non-resident property owners within an area? If so, should this apply to overseas investors?

Question 32. Should voting rights be extended to non-resident occupiers (e.g. commercial lessees such as business owners who lease premises within an area but live outside of it)?

Question 33. Should multiple persons be able to claim non-resident voter eligibility for one property (e.g. two or more non-resident owners or lessees of a property)?

Question 34. Should people, based on the number of properties they own, be entitled to more than one vote per division?

Question 35. Who should be responsible for the creation, verification and maintenance of a non-residents' electoral roll?

Voter franchise should be consistent with State and Federal governments and only apply to residents. Mechanisms are required to ensure that rates for non-residents are appropriate, and these are catered for in current and previous legislation. There is some evidence that rates in many Councils for non-resident and non-residential rates are higher than for residential ratepayers. The recent Court of Appeal decision Xtrata and Ors v Shire of Bowen demonstrated that the Court can strike down a rate which is based on the capacity of the ultimate ratepayer to pay, rather than relevant local factors. In addition, most Councils are keen to encourage development in their area. Therefore there are legal and natural limitations to non-resident rate levels, which greatly limits the need for any direct representation of these groups on Council.

Queensland abolished ratepayer franchise for Local Government in 1920, and was the first State to do so. Under the Local Government Act, Councillors are required to represent their community, so any representation by sectional interests would be a retrograde move.

The key objective is that Councillors should be as representative as possible as the community they represent. Inclusion of non-resident ratepayers would contradict this objective.



## 6. Voting Systems

#### 6.1 Alternative Systems

Question 36. Which voting system is most appropriate for local government elections - Optional Preferential voting, Compulsory Preferential voting, First-Past-The-Post or Proportional Representation? Why?

Question 37. Would different voting systems work better for different sized local governments? Why?

Question 38. Should Proportional Representation be introduced for Queensland local government elections? If so, why and

- (a) which model/s should be implemented?
- (b) how would this be implemented in divided and undivided councils?
- (c) should it apply for all councils? If not, which councils should proportional representation apply to?

The Issues Paper provides a useful summary of the main options. From the outline, it seems clear that of the Proportional Representation (PR) systems, the List System and MMP systems require or work best with political parties or political teams. Political Parties in Queensland Local Government are a minor part of the political landscape, although it has been reported that around 30 percent of candidates have some affiliation with a political party. Teams of candidates are more common, but this still does not occur across the board. Therefore, these forms of Proportional Representation would be difficult to apply in Queensland. The author has worked in Councils with both political parties and those without, and both approaches can be effective. The advantage of political parties are two-fold. Firstly, the community is more likely to be presented with the policies, values and objectives of the political parties which does not always occur with independent candidates. Secondly, political parties separate the fund raising process from the candidates role, which greatly reduces the opportunity for conflicts of interest or abuse. However, in the response to Questions 16 – 24, I have suggested approaches which can satisfy both of these requirements without the need for political parties, or extensive fund raising.

In my view, Proportional Representation using the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) system is preferable for multi-member electorates, such as multi-member divisions and undivided Councils. Preferential or Optional Preferential voting is superior, and well understood for single member divisions. It is important to note that proportional representation in multi-member districts or undivided Councils would require voters to mark their preferences on the voting paper in the same way they now mark their papers in State and Federal elections under preferential voting methods. The difference is in the way the votes are counted rather than in the way the votes are marked. Voters in Australia are already familiar with Preferential Voting for single member State and Federal Electorates, and a form of PR for the Senate (which effectively has multi-member electorates, namely the States and Territories). STV has also been successfully used in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia.

The Issues Paper infers that PR requires political parties for it to operate. Although PR would work well with elections involving political parties or teams, STV would also work well without political parties.



The main difference between Preferential Voting, and STV-PR is that under Preferential voting, if no candidate achieves a majority, the votes for the least popular candidates are distributed until one candidate achieves a majority. Under STV-PR, the process operates almost in reverse – the excess votes of the most popular candidates are distributed until other candidates achieve the quota.

There is no reason to change the voting method for single member divisions, and in fact, it would be preferable for this to be consistent with State and Federal voting methods. There is an argument that elections with, say, PR-STV in multimember electorates and Optional Preferential Voting for single member electorates (including the Mayor) would be confusing to voters. However, voters would only need to mark their preferences in both ballots, in a similar way to Federal elections. In Federal elections, candidates are elected to the House of Representatives using Preferential Voting, whereas candidates to the Senate in the same election use Proportional Representation by either making their preferences or using the list method. This dual election method is well accepted by the Australian electorate.

The main issue is the voting method for multi-member Local Government electorates. Under current arrangements, if any Council Division is multi-member, all Divisions and the Mayoralty are required to be counted on a first past the post FPTP basis. FPTP is the least representative voting method currently used in Local Government. This method has the significant disadvantage that a large field of candidates (which is otherwise desirable) can result in candidates with only a small proportion of first votes being elected. The most notorious case was Maroochy Shire which for several terms had one two-member division. This required all Divisions and the Mayor to be elected on the FPTP basis, and one Mayor was elected with only 13 percent if the votes. It also has the disadvantage that if multiple candidates from a specific (smaller) community run for election their votes are split and the entire community can be unrepresented. A significant problem of FPTP is that candidates can be elected with well below the proportional number of votes, but once elected they have the same voting power on Council as those with substantially greater electoral support. Further, in my observation, it is sometimes common for the elected candidates who received less than the proportional number of votes to become a disruptive influence on Council so as to gain media attention. This leaves FPTP systems more open to manipulation based on the number of candidates from various communities. PR-STV would overcome this problem, and ensure the best level of representation for multi-member electorates.

For example, suppose there are 3 Councillor positions in a multi-member Division, and four candidates. If the results are Candidate A 40%, B 35%, C 15% and D 10% of the vote, First Past The Post (FPTP) voting would result in candidates A, B and C being elected. However, only candidates A and B received more than a third of the votes. Under STV-PR, candidates A and B would still be elected, but surplus votes from candidates A and B would be allocated until either candidate C or D achieved more than the quota of 34%. Both systems would result in the most popular, well known candidates being elected, however only STV-PR would ensure that the less popular candidates were only elected if they received preferences from other candidates. It needs to be remembered that once elected, all Councillors have the same vote on Council, regardless of their primary vote. If Candidate C is elected, he or she would have the same vote on Council as candidate A who had nearly three times the primary vote.

The only advantage FPTP has over STV/PR is administrative efficiency. As I have argued consistently in this submission, electoral methods which promote the most representative candidates being elected are much more important than administrative efficiency for a short period every four years.

<b>END OF SUBMISSION</b>	

