Criminal Code (Defence of Dwellings and Other Premises—Castle Law) Amendment Bill 2026

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SUBMISSION TO THE

JUSTICE, INTEGRITY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY COMMITTEE

QUEENSLAND PARLIAMENT

Criminal Code (Defence of Dwellings and Other Premises—Castle Law) Amendment Bill 2026

A Submission in Support of the Bill

Submitted by:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This submission supports the **Criminal Code (Defence of Dwellings and Other Premises—Castle Law) Amendment Bill 2026** (the Bill), introduced by Mr Robbie Katter MP, Member for Traeger, on 4 March 2026 and referred to the Justice, Integrity and Community Safety Committee for examination.

Queensland's self-defence provisions under the Criminal Code Act 1899 have not been substantively amended since 1901. The Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) has itself described them as "unnecessarily complex and hard to understand." The Bill addresses this deficiency by codifying castle law principles within the Criminal Code, extending protection beyond dwellings to other premises, clarifying when force may lawfully be used against an intruder, and recognising that certain aggravated intrusions justify a stronger defensive response.

The case for reform rests on three pillars: (1) the demonstrated inability of police to protect all Queenslanders, particularly in regional and remote areas where the Queensland Audit Office has found urgent response time targets are missed in 35–38% of cases; (2) unacceptably high levels of property crime, with 45,273 unlawful entry victims recorded statewide in 2024 and Queensland leading the nation in vehicle theft; and (3) the overwhelming democratic mandate expressed through E-Petition 4267-25, which attracted 113,380 signatures—the largest e-petition in Queensland parliamentary history.

Western Australia and South Australia already provide significantly stronger home-defence protections than Queensland. The United Kingdom's 2013 "grossly disproportionate" test offers a proven, balanced model that has been tested against human rights obligations and found compatible. This submission argues that the Bill represents a measured, proportionate reform that aligns Queensland with contemporary Australian and international best practice while maintaining meaningful safeguards against misuse.

1. THE CURRENT INQUIRY AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT

The Bill was introduced on 4 March 2026 by Mr Robbie Katter MP and referred to the Justice, Integrity and Community Safety Committee. It represents the reintroduction, with refinements, of the Criminal Code (Defence of Dwellings and Other Premises—Castle Law) Amendment Bill 2024, which was introduced by Mr Nick Dametto MP on 1 May 2024 but lapsed when the 57th Parliament was dissolved on 1 October 2024. No committee report on the 2024 Bill was completed before dissolution.

The Bill's reintroduction follows the tabling of E-Petition 4267-25, which closed on 24 October 2025 with 113,380 signatures—the largest e-petition in Queensland parliamentary history. The petition called upon the Queensland Parliament to enact castle law legislation. It was tabled on 30 October 2025 and referred to the Attorney-General, the Hon. Deborah Frecklington MP. The Attorney-General's response, dated 1 December 2025, stated that Queensland law "does not penalise those who act reasonably to protect themselves," pointed to existing sections 267 and 271, and referenced the QLRC's Review of Particular Criminal Defences. The response did not commit to introducing castle law legislation.

The QLRC's Review of Particular Criminal Defences, commenced on 15 November 2023, delivered its final report to the Attorney-General on 1 December 2025. The report has not yet

been tabled in Parliament and its recommendations remain unpublished. The QLRC's consultation paper, released 20 February 2025 under the title "Equality and Integrity: Reforming Criminal Defences in Queensland," signalled that "significant reforms are required" to the self-defence provisions, which it described as "unnecessarily complex."

The convergence of these three developments—the Bill, the record e-petition, and the QLRC review—creates an unprecedented opportunity for meaningful legislative reform. This submission urges the Committee to recommend that the Bill be passed, with such amendments as may strengthen its effectiveness and safeguards.

2. QUEENSLAND'S SELF-DEFENCE FRAMEWORK IS OUTDATED AND INADEQUATE

2.1 Section 267: Defence of Dwelling

Section 267 of the Criminal Code is Queensland's closest existing provision to a castle doctrine. It permits a person in "peaceable possession" of a dwelling to use force—including potentially lethal force—to prevent or repel a person from unlawfully entering or remaining in the dwelling, provided the occupant believes on reasonable grounds that the intruder intends to commit an indictable offence and that force is necessary.

Section 267 has several notable features: it contains no explicit proportionality requirement (confirmed in R v Spajic [2011] QCA 232 and R v Cuskelly [2009] QCA 375); it imposes no duty to retreat from the dwelling; and it applies a mixed subjective-objective test—the occupant must actually believe force is necessary, and that belief must rest on reasonable grounds.

However, section 267 has significant limitations that the Bill appropriately addresses:

1. **Narrow spatial scope:** Section 267 applies only to the dwelling structure itself—not to the yard, garage, curtilage, shed, or surrounding property. In R v Richards [2023] QCA 7, a homeowner who used a bow and arrow against an intruder on a concrete slab between the house and shed was denied the section 267 defence because the slab was not part of the dwelling. This distinction is arbitrary and fails to reflect the reality of how Queenslanders live, particularly in regional areas with large properties.
2. **Indictable offence threshold:** The requirement that the intruder must intend an "indictable offence" (rather than any offence) sets a higher threshold than comparable provisions in Western Australia. Expecting a homeowner, woken at 3am by an intruder, to assess whether the intruder's intent constitutes an indictable offence is unrealistic and unfair.
3. **No coverage of vehicles or workplaces:** Section 267 provides no protection for occupants of vehicles being carjacked or workers defending their premises. Section 277, which covers broader premises, caps force at "reasonably necessary" and prohibits grievous bodily harm—an inadequate response to violent intrusions.

2.2 Sections 271 and 272: General Self-Defence

Sections 271 and 272 govern general self-defence. Section 271 provides a two-tier structure: reasonably necessary non-lethal force for ordinary assaults, and escalation to lethal force where the defender reasonably fears death or grievous bodily harm. Section 272, governing

provoked assaults, is the only provision requiring retreat—the defendant must have declined further conflict and retreated as far as practicable. The Court of Appeal in R v Dayney [2023] QCA 62 found section 272 to be "ambiguous," underscoring the problems with these century-old provisions.

The overall effect is a fragmented, overlapping framework that creates confusion for homeowners, police, prosecutors, and juries alike. A homeowner confronting an intruder must navigate at least four separate provisions (ss.267, 271, 272, 277), each with different tests, thresholds, and limitations. This is the precise problem the Bill seeks to resolve.

2.3 Cases That Illustrate the Need for Reform

The Dean Webber case (Alva Beach, 2018): A 19-year-old stabbed two men who burst into his home at night after multiple 000 calls went unanswered because police were too understaffed to respond in the remote North Queensland community. He was ultimately not charged, but endured months of investigation and profound personal trauma. The case epitomises the reality facing remote Queenslanders: when police cannot respond, residents have no choice but to rely on self-help for immediate protection.

The Emma Lovell case (North Lakes, 2022): On Boxing Day 2022, Mrs Lovell was fatally stabbed during a home invasion by juveniles at her North Lakes home. The case catalysed massive public support for castle law and directly contributed to the record e-petition. It demonstrated that home invasions carry lethal risk even in suburban settings and that the current legal framework offers cold comfort to victims and their families.

R v Cuskelly [2009] QCA 375: A man who stepped outside his unit to confront an intoxicated person threatening him and his wife was initially convicted of murder (later reduced to manslaughter on appeal). The trial judge observed that "all you had to do was close your front door." The message sent to homeowners is that the safest legal course is to cower behind locked doors—even when police cannot respond and the threat is escalating.

R v Richards [2023] QCA 7: A homeowner denied the section 267 defence because the confrontation occurred on a concrete slab between the house and shed rather than within the dwelling structure. This case exposes the absurdity of the current spatial limitation and underscores why the Bill's extension to "other premises" is both necessary and proportionate.

3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AUSTRALIAN JURISDICTIONS

A comparative analysis of Australian jurisdictions reveals that Queensland sits well behind Western Australia and South Australia, which have enacted explicit castle-style provisions providing stronger protections for home defenders.

3.1 Western Australia: Section 244 of the Criminal Code

Western Australia's section 244, inserted by the Criminal Code Amendment (Home Invasion) Act 2000, is the strongest home-defence provision in Australia. It permits an occupant in peaceable possession to use "any force or do anything else" they believe on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent a home invader from entering, to cause a home invader to leave, to defend against violence, or to prevent the commission of an offence. The provision

operates as a standalone defence that applies "even if the conduct it authorises would not otherwise be authorised" under general self-defence law.

Key features of the WA model that Queensland should adopt include: the lower offence threshold (any offence, not just indictable offences); the extension to "associated places" including garages, backyards, and common property; and the explicit standalone nature of the defence, which provides certainty for both homeowners and courts.

3.2 South Australia: Section 15C of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935

South Australia's section 15C, enacted in 2003, takes a different but equally robust approach: it explicitly removes the proportionality requirement for cases of innocent defence against home invasion. Where the defendant genuinely believes a home invasion is occurring, was not engaged in criminal misconduct that gave rise to the threat, and was not substantially intoxicated, the standard requirement of reasonable proportionality does not apply. This provides a complete defence to all charges including murder.

South Australia includes sensible safeguards that should inform the Committee's consideration of the Bill: the defendant bears the burden of establishing the section 15C conditions on the balance of probabilities; must be sober; and must not have been engaged in criminal conduct. These safeguards effectively prevent misuse while protecting genuine defenders.

3.3 Other Australian Jurisdictions

New South Wales repealed its dedicated Home Invasion (Occupants Protection) Act 1998 in 2001 and now applies only the general self-defence test under section 418 of the Crimes Act 1900. Section 420 bars deadly force where the sole purpose is to protect property or prevent trespass—a significant limitation for home defenders. Victoria offers the weakest protections of any mainland state, with no home-specific provisions and no relaxed proportionality test. A 2025 Legislative Council motion requesting a law reform review of home defence was rejected by the Victorian Government.

The ranking from strongest to weakest home-defence protections across Australian jurisdictions is: Western Australia, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, New South Wales, Victoria, the ACT, and the Northern Territory. Queensland has clear room for improvement, and two proven Australian models to draw from. The Bill would move Queensland from the middle of the pack to a position of national leadership in protecting the rights of home defenders.

4. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

4.1 The United Kingdom: The "Grossly Disproportionate" Test

The United Kingdom's evolution on home defence is particularly instructive. The Tony Martin case (1999)—where a Norfolk farmer was convicted of murder after shooting two burglars fleeing his farmhouse—generated enormous public outcry and over a decade of parliamentary debate. Reforms culminated in the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which

amended section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to create a two-tier system.

For non-householders, force fails the reasonableness test if it was "disproportionate." For householders, force fails only if it was "grossly disproportionate"—meaning force that is merely disproportionate can still be found reasonable in the home-defence context. The two-stage jury test asks: (1) Was the force grossly disproportionate? If yes, the defence fails. (2) If not, was it reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be?

The UK model has proven effective in practice. In the Richard Osborn-Brooks case (2018), a 78-year-old pensioner who fatally stabbed a burglar threatening him with a screwdriver was never prosecuted, and a coroner returned a verdict of lawful killing. The Court of Appeal in R v Steven Ray [2017] confirmed the framework, with the Lord Chief Justice stating that Parliament had "conferred a greater latitude in cases of a householder in his own home." Crucially, the UK model has been tested against the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 2, right to life) and found compatible. This model provides a strong template for Queensland.

4.2 The United States: Castle Doctrine vs. Stand Your Ground

Understanding the distinction between castle doctrine and stand-your-ground laws is critical for informed consideration of the Bill. Castle doctrine applies only in the home (and sometimes vehicles and workplaces), removing the duty to retreat when an intruder enters. Stand your ground extends this principle to any public location. Forty-six US states have some form of castle doctrine—including all states that otherwise require a duty to retreat. Even critics of self-defence expansion generally accept castle doctrine as reasonable.

Academic research examining US self-defence expansion must be read carefully. The influential Cheng and Hoekstra (2013) study finding a 7–9% increase in homicides, and a JAMA study finding Florida experienced a 24.4% increase in homicide after its 2005 law, primarily examined stand-your-ground provisions applying in public spaces—not castle doctrine in the home. As discussed further in Part 6 of this submission, the conflation of these distinct legal concepts is the most common analytical error in debate about the Bill.

4.3 Canada: A Simplified but Restrictive Framework

Canada's 2012 Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act replaced notoriously complex provisions with a unified, flexible test under Criminal Code section 34. Canada explicitly does not have a castle doctrine, treating the home as merely one factor in a multi-factor reasonableness assessment. The landmark R v Khill (2021 SCC 37) decision held that a homeowner's decision to go outside with a loaded shotgun rather than call 911 was relevant to assessing whether his response was reasonable—emphasising de-escalation even on one's own property.

Canada's approach is instructive for its simplification methodology but is too restrictive for Queensland's purposes. The Canadian model places insufficient weight on the unique sanctity of the home and does not account for the vast distances and policing gaps that characterise Queensland's regional and remote communities.

5. THE EVIDENCE DEMANDS REFORM

5.1 Police Cannot Protect Remote Queenslanders

The Queensland Audit Office's 2023 report on Deploying Police Resources found that the Queensland Police Service met its target of attending 85% of urgent calls within 12 minutes only 78.2% of the time statewide. In Far North Queensland, the figure drops to 62–65%—meaning more than one in three urgent calls goes unattended within the target timeframe.

Queensland covers 1.85 million square kilometres with just 341 police stations, many of them single-officer operations in remote communities. The Audit Office found that rostering does not match demand patterns, infrastructure is "not fit for purpose" in some districts, and QPS was "reluctant" to close underperforming stations because they are often the only government building in town. For pastoral properties in western Queensland and communities across Cape York, effective police response times are measured in hours, not minutes. These residents have no realistic option but to rely on self-help for immediate protection.

The Bill recognises this reality. When the State cannot guarantee timely police response, it has a corresponding obligation to ensure that citizens who defend themselves against violent intrusion are not subjected to criminal prosecution for doing so reasonably. The Bill does not create a right to take the law into one's own hands; it provides legal certainty for citizens whom the law has already, in practical terms, left to fend for themselves.

5.2 Crime Statistics Demand Action

Queensland recorded 45,273 unlawful entry victims in 2024, with approximately 70% targeting residential locations. While this represented a 9% decrease from the 2023 peak of 49,490, Queensland consistently ranks among the highest states for break-and-enter per capita—approximately 26 per 10,000 people compared to 22 per 10,000 in Victoria. Australia overall has the 7th highest burglary rate globally.

Queensland also leads the nation in vehicle theft, recording 20,153 stolen vehicles in 2023—the highest of any state. Insurance Council of Australia data shows Queensland motor vehicle theft claims rose 101% in number and 214% in value between 2015 and 2024, with rural and regional claim frequency increasing 62%. First-half 2025 data shows encouraging declines (break-ins down 12%, stolen cars down 6.4%), but these improvements follow years of escalation and the absolute numbers remain confronting. The extension of protections to occupied vehicles under the Bill is therefore both timely and warranted.

5.3 The Psychological Devastation of Home Invasion

Research published in Trauma, Violence & Abuse confirms that home invasion is a potentially traumatic experience because most people consider their home an extension of the self and a place where the self is protected against the outside world. A systematic review of psychological distress among burglary victims found that 41% met clinical criteria for high-severity post-traumatic stress symptoms. Victims commonly experience PTSD, depression, anxiety, sleeplessness, hypervigilance, and intrusive thoughts—symptoms that can persist for years after the event.

The psychological mechanism is explained by Janoff-Bulman's Shattered Assumptions Theory: the invasion destroys the victim's fundamental belief in their home as a safe haven. These harms are compounded when the legal system then subjects victims—who defended

themselves in terror—to investigation or prosecution for their response. The Bill would reduce this secondary victimisation by providing clearer legal protections, thereby supporting both the physical safety and psychological wellbeing of Queenslanders.

5.4 The Right to Feel Safe in One's Home

The castle doctrine is grounded in a principle as old as the common law itself: that a person's home is their castle, and they should not be required to flee from it when threatened. This principle was articulated by Sir Edward Coke in Semayne's Case (1604) and has been recognised in every common law jurisdiction since. It reflects a fundamental societal understanding that the home occupies a unique position in the hierarchy of places a person may defend—it is not merely property, but the seat of personal security, family safety, and human dignity.

For property investors and landlords, the Bill also protects the security of their investment. A property that is the subject of repeated break-ins or invasions suffers not only physical damage but reputational harm affecting its rental and resale value. The legal framework should support—not undermine—the legitimate interests of property owners in protecting their assets.

6. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS

6.1 Castle Doctrine Is Categorically Different from Stand Your Ground

The most common objection to the Bill conflates castle doctrine with stand-your-ground laws. The RAND Corporation's systematic review explicitly notes that research would ideally assess whether self-defence laws affect outcomes in the home versus in public areas—but this disaggregated research has not been done. The Cheng and Hoekstra study finding 7–9% homicide increases examined laws that removed the duty to retreat in places outside of one's home. The Trayvon Martin case occurred on a public sidewalk. The Ahmaud Arbery case involved pursuit on a public street.

The Bill is not a stand-your-ground law. It applies only within dwellings and other premises—not in public spaces. The triggering event is objective and verifiable: did someone unlawfully enter the dwelling or premises? This factual threshold substantially reduces the scope for the problematic outcomes associated with US stand-your-ground provisions. The Committee should reject any attempt to conflate the Bill with stand-your-ground legislation, as the two are fundamentally different in scope, application, and risk profile.

6.2 The Vigilantism Concern Is Misplaced

Castle doctrine is the antithesis of vigilantism. The defender does not seek out confrontation—the confrontation enters their home. Every case cited as vigilantism under expanded self-defence laws (Arbery, Martin, Perry) occurred in public spaces under stand-your-ground provisions. A homeowner who responds to an intruder breaking into their dwelling at 3am is not acting as a vigilante; they are responding to an immediate, uninvited threat in the one place they have the greatest right to be safe.

Queensland's existing section 267 already establishes that homeowners have no duty to retreat from their dwelling. The Bill does not introduce a fundamentally new right; it provides clarity, extends the spatial scope to reflect how people actually live, and removes ambiguities

that currently expose genuine defenders to prosecution risk. The Bill's safeguards—including the withdrawal of the defence when an intruder is fleeing, and the exclusion of initial aggressors—further prevent any reasonable characterisation as encouraging vigilantism.

6.3 Racial Bias Concerns Relate to Public Encounters, Not Home Defence

Studies finding racial disparities in US self-defence outcomes—such as the Urban Institute finding that white-on-black homicides in SYG states were ruled justified 36% of the time versus 3% for black-on-white—examine stand-your-ground claims in public spaces where subjective "reasonable fear" of strangers intersects with racial profiling. Castle doctrine has an objective triggering event: did someone unlawfully enter the dwelling? This factual threshold substantially reduces the scope for racial bias. Australia's fundamentally different firearms culture, social context, and legal framework further limits the relevance of US racial disparity data to the Queensland context.

6.4 Violence Escalation Is Driven by Public Encounters

The studies finding homicide increases associated with expanded self-defence laws are unable to separate home-defence effects from public stand-your-ground effects. Cheng and Hoekstra themselves found no evidence of deterrence for burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault—the absence of increased home-specific crimes suggests that any violence escalation occurs in public encounters, not in home defence situations. Australia's strict firearms regulation eliminates the primary mechanism driving US homicide increases: the ready availability of guns for impulsive use in public confrontations.

Conversely, research on the deterrent effect of castle doctrine on burglary shows more promising results. A study by Ayers (2015) examining Texas's castle doctrine law found statistically significant reductions in burglary rates in Houston following enactment. While the evidence is mixed, the logical mechanism is sound: rational offenders who know that homeowners have clear legal authority to defend themselves have a greater incentive to avoid occupied premises.

7. THE BILL'S SPECIFIC PROVISIONS AND RECOMMENDED ENHANCEMENTS

This submission supports the Bill's core amendments to section 267. The following observations are offered to assist the Committee in its consideration of specific provisions:

7.1 Extension to "Other Premises"

The Bill's extension of castle law protections beyond dwellings to other premises is strongly supported. The current restriction to the dwelling structure itself—excluding garages, sheds, yards, and vehicles—is arbitrary and fails to reflect Queensland realities. The Committee should ensure that the definition of "premises" is sufficiently broad to encompass occupied vehicles (addressing carjacking), caravans and campervans (reflecting Queensland's significant grey nomad and tourism population), workplaces (particularly sole-operator businesses and rural properties), and curtilage including yards, garages, sheds, and common property of apartment buildings.

7.2 Aggravated Intrusion Provisions

The Bill's recognition that certain aggravated intrusions justify a stronger defensive response reflects the reality that not all home invasions carry the same level of threat. The Committee should ensure that the aggravated circumstances are clearly defined and include, at minimum: intrusion at night; intrusion by an armed person; intrusion involving the use or threat of violence; intrusion where the occupant reasonably believes there is a risk of serious harm to any person in the dwelling; and intrusion by multiple persons.

7.3 Recommended Safeguards

This submission recommends that the Committee consider including the following safeguards, drawing on the proven models in Western Australia and South Australia:

1. **Co-habitant exception:** The defence should not apply between lawful co-occupants of the dwelling, preventing misuse in domestic violence situations. However, where a domestic violence order excludes a person from the dwelling, the protected person should be able to invoke the defence against the restrained party who enters in breach of the order.
2. **Sobriety requirement:** Following South Australia's section 15C model, the defender must not be substantially affected by voluntary non-therapeutic consumption of drugs or alcohol at the time force is used.
3. **Clean hands provision:** The defender must not have been engaged in criminal misconduct that gave rise to the confrontation or the intruder's entry.
4. **Initial aggressor exclusion:** The defence should be unavailable to a person who initiated the confrontation or enticed another person into the dwelling for the purpose of using force against them.
5. **Police exemption:** The defence cannot be invoked against law enforcement officers acting lawfully in their official capacity, including officers executing warrants.
6. **No pursuit principle:** The defence should cease when the intruder withdraws from the dwelling or premises. Pursuing a fleeing intruder takes the defender outside the scope of the provision.
7. **Excessive self-defence as partial defence:** Where the homeowner's force is found to exceed what the provision permits and the full defence fails, a partial defence reducing murder to manslaughter should be available, following the NSW section 421 model.
8. **Civil immunity:** Defenders acting within the provision should be protected from civil claims by intruders, preventing secondary victimisation through civil litigation.

8. THE RURAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

This submission is made from the perspective of a resident of Mareeba in Far North Queensland. The rural and regional dimension of this debate cannot be overstated. Residents of regional and remote Queensland face a fundamentally different security environment than residents of metropolitan Brisbane, the Gold Coast, or the Sunshine Coast.

In Far North Queensland, police response times to urgent calls miss the QPS target in more than one in three cases. Many communities are served by single-officer stations that are not staffed 24 hours. Properties in the Atherton Tablelands, Cape York, and western Queensland

may be an hour or more from the nearest police station. During the wet season, road access can be cut entirely, leaving residents completely isolated.

For these Queenslanders, the question of self-defence is not theoretical. It is a practical reality they may face at any time, with no prospect of timely police assistance. The Bill provides these residents with legal certainty that they will not be prosecuted for defending themselves and their families in circumstances where the State has been unable to provide protection. This is not a matter of ideology; it is a matter of fairness.

9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The case for castle law in Queensland rests not on importing American gun culture but on three fundamental realities: the state's self-defence laws have not been updated in 125 years and are acknowledged by the QLRC as inadequate; police demonstrably cannot protect all Queenslanders, particularly in remote and regional areas; and two Australian states—Western Australia and South Australia—have already enacted stronger provisions without the catastrophic consequences critics predict.

The 113,380 signatures on E-Petition 4267-25 represent the largest democratic expression in Queensland parliamentary history on any single issue. The people of Queensland have spoken clearly: they want the legal right to defend their homes, their families, and themselves with confidence that the law will protect them, not prosecute them.

The Bill provides a measured, proportionate framework that aligns Queensland with contemporary Australian and international best practice. With the safeguards recommended in this submission, it will protect genuine defenders while maintaining meaningful limits on excessive force.

This submission respectfully recommends that the Committee recommend the Bill be passed, subject to such amendments as may strengthen its effectiveness and safeguards as outlined in Part 7 of this submission.

Submitted by [redacted]*, Queensland*

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