

Breach Bail, Go to Jail and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2026

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Dear Chair,

Breach Bail, Go to Jail and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2026

The Association is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the *Breach Bail, Go to Jail and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill)*.

Executive Summary

1. The Association does not wish to diminish the harm caused to the community and victims of crime by recidivist offending, and is supportive of Government developing policy to prevent and address that offending.
2. However, the practical ramifications of those policies are of concern to the Association. They have the power to affect the rule of law and the administration of justice and the courts, and to delay the conduct of both criminal and civil proceedings.
3. Two issues fundamental to upholding the rule of law arise with respect to this proposed legislation:
 - (a) **first**, the proposed breach of bail offence (sec. 29AA) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 12 months. Mandatory minimum sentences remove the exercise of judicial discretion. They remove the ability for a judge to appropriately and justly reflect the relative seriousness of the conduct involved, as well as matters in mitigation. Judicial discretion in sentencing is not a rarefied academic concept but a practical requirement of a country that values the rule of law. It protects the community from the risk of arbitrary punishment and detention. It is what allows us to call ourselves, and to be, a civilised, advanced and safe society.
 - (b) **second**, the proposed legislation contravenes the rule against being sentenced twice over the same facts. This is one of the oldest concepts in the criminal law, well and truly predating the *Criminal Code* 1899. But that is the effect of proposed sec. 29AA: the same facts will give rise to both the underlying charge and the breach of bail charge, and the court then

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sentences for both, with the breach of bail charge carrying the 12 month mandatory minimum sentence.

4. The proposed legislation changes the test for bail on that second offence and the breach of bail offence itself. The defendant does not “*breach his bail and immediately go to jail*”. Rather, if he is alleged to breach his bail, he has the twin offences: the substantive offence and the breach of bail offence. The mandatory minimum sentence is not imposed immediately but after he pleads guilty or is tried and found guilty. In the meantime, while he may be held on remand, he can also apply for bail (again). But, the test for bail at that point is quite different to the test on, say, the first offence. On the second round the Court must have “*a high degree of confidence*” that the offender will not commit another offence. That is a phrase that is unknown to the criminal law, and is currently before the High Court of Australia on a case on appeal from the Northern Territory.
5. The test for bail on the subsequent offence does not take into account the strength of the prosecution case, nor time already served.
6. Practical issues also arise: sec. 29AA removes the incentive to enter an early plea for the second offence (the underlying offence). That offence might carry a sentence of far less than 12 months' imprisonment but, if the defendant is facing a mandatory 12 month imprisonment for the breach of bail offence, they might as well plead not guilty, have a jury or summary trial, see if the prosecution can prove its case and, if they are acquitted, then the breach of bail charge (sec. 29AA) falls away. Without the incentive to enter an early plea of guilty, far more trials will run.
7. This will create backlogs in the courts, with the anxiety that those long delays and trials cause to the victims of the alleged offending, and the witnesses. It will also affect police resourcing as contested hearings require the preparation of police briefs of evidence, and time away from front line duties while police are seeing to those administrative matters and giving evidence in court.
8. Those delays will not affect only criminal trials: civil cases, commercial cases, insurance, succession – every other case - will also be delayed.
9. This submission commences with a consideration of the proposed provisions and the context in which they will be enacted. It then considers:
 - (a) the provision applying to any person on bail for **any offence**;
 - (b) the mandatory minimum penalty;
 - (c) the introduction of double punishment for the same conduct;
 - (d) the breadth of offences which have been prescribed as applicable breaching offences; and

- (e) the unintended consequences.
10. It then turns to the “*high degree of confidence test*”, the present challenge in the High Court of Australia to the constitutionality of an equivalent Northern Territory provisions, the impact of the proposed provisions on detention and correctional facilities and the overriding (again) of the *Human Rights Act*.

The Provisions

11. The Bill has two primary functions. One is to create a new offence, under the *Bail Act 1980*, for breaching bail by committing particular offences. The new offence carries a mandatory minimum penalty, applicable to both adults and children. The other is to introduce a new requirement (for children and adults) who apply for bail in relation to a prescribed offence, which is alleged to have been committed while the person was on bail. The relevant provisions introduce a “*high degree of confidence*” test, for which an applicant bears the onus of proof (**the confidence test**).

Bail – Generally

12. To appreciate the difficulties posed by the Bill, it is necessary to have some understanding of the importance a properly administered bail system plays in our system of justice.
13. The most important principle which underpins our system of criminal justice is the presumption of innocence. A person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent. The presumption is only displaced once evidence has been called at trial sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or when the accused enters a plea of guilty. Only then can a person be punished for a crime.
14. This is not a technical or anachronistic concept. Public confidence in the justice system would quickly erode if it were thought that the system led to the punishment or incarceration of innocent people, or people who were not afforded proper process.
15. An allegation that an offence has been committed is just that, an allegation. It is the experience of members of the Association that even allegations that seem, at first blush, to be well supported by evidence (particularly at early stages of investigations – when bail applications are often heard) can prove to be weak, or indeed unfounded, by the time of trial. It cannot be doubted that innocent people are charged with offences. It is to be hoped that the trial process reveals the truth in these cases. The proper administration of a bail system protects against unjust outcomes whilst a person is awaiting trial.
16. Recent discourse has included references to bail being “*a privilege, not a right*”. A privilege is a special benefit granted to some but withheld from others. Bail,

properly understood, cannot be described in such terms. Bail is not granted as a gift to an applicant, or a form of special leniency. It is granted as recognition of the fact that a person is presumed to be innocent and that, at the time of bail being granted, the legal process has not yet run its course. In those circumstances, without good reason, it would be unjust for them to be incarcerated.

17. It is not suggested that everybody should be granted bail. The refusal of bail under the current legislative regime is relatively commonplace. However, the current provisions of the *Bail Act*, which permit the refusal of bail, have at their heart a weighing of specified risk (failing to appear, committing further offences, etc.) with a recognition that a person is presumed to be innocent. The amendments proposed by the Bill will significantly shift the scales in the balancing act that is currently required.

The Breach Offence

18. The proposed breach of bail offence would be created by the insertion of sec. 29AA of the *Bail Act*. In simple terms, any person who is on bail (or unlawfully at large, or has failed to answer to a summons or a notice to appear) and commits a prescribed offence, commits an offence contrary to sec. 29AA (**a sec. 29AA offence**). Liability depends upon conviction for the prescribed offence: sec. 29AA(3). Significantly, an offence against sec. 29AA carries a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of 12 months, served wholly in a correctional facility. There are proposed provisions which ensure that laws prohibiting double punishment do not serve as a bar to a defendant being sentenced to (at least) that 12 month period for the sec. 29AA offence, along with an additional penalty for the offence that was committed whilst on bail.
19. Problematic features of this proposal include:
 - (a) the provision applying to any person on bail for **any offence**;
 - (b) the mandatory minimum penalty;
 - (c) the introduction of double punishment for the same conduct;
 - (d) the breadth of offences which have been prescribed as applicable breaching offences; and
 - (e) the unintended consequences.

Applicability to all persons on bail

20. The offence provision would apply to **anyone** on bail for **any** offence. That is, whilst the offence is only committed if a person commits a particular **prescribed** offence

whilst on bail, it is not limited only to people who were on bail for such a prescribed offence.

21. This is problematic due to the wide and varied circumstances in which a person can find themselves on bail. In the Association's view, these provisions do not merely create a risk of unjust outcomes, they ensure that unjust outcomes will occur.
22. It may not be readily understood in the community, that even relatively straight forward traffic offences often result in a defendant signing a bail undertaking and being admitted to bail.
23. Consider, for example, a young P plater who, whilst not intoxicated, is driving with a small amount of alcohol in their system. They would be charged with a drink driving offence. If their matter is adjourned (perhaps for them to complete a traffic safety program), they would likely be released on bail. The likely penalty for their drink driving offence would be a modest fine.
24. However, if whilst they were awaiting their court date, that person makes a foolish decision to get into the passenger seat of a stolen car, they commit an unlawful use of motor vehicle offence. This is so even though they did not take the car and are not driving the car. They would simply need to know that it was stolen.
25. For this subsequent offence they would, perhaps, receive a sentence of probation. That sentence would be geared towards supporting the person to be rehabilitated. In that way, the sentence would seek to ensure the community is protected by rehabilitating someone who had begun down the wrong path, but not yet engaged in an entrenched criminal lifestyle.
26. Under the provisions proposed by the Bill, this young person would be sentenced to at least 12 months in custody, served in a correctional facility. The essential criminality of the offending described above is such that it would not ordinarily be suggested that the person deserved to be imprisoned (much less for 12 months). The incredibly broad net cast by the provision, in applying to anyone who is on bail for any offence, would have that result. The resulting punishment would be seriously disproportionate to the offending behaviour.

Mandatory minimum penalty

27. The Association has a long history of opposing mandatory minimum sentence provisions. That position is maintained in response to this Bill.
28. Mandatory minimum provisions negate judicial discretion. They remove the ability for a judge to appropriately and justly reflect the relative seriousness of the conduct involved, as well as matters in mitigation.

29. A period of 12 months, served entirely in actual custody, removes scope for sentences which would have, as their goal, rehabilitation of the offender (and thereby actual long-term protection of the community from further offending). Where an offender might otherwise have been sentenced (for the breaching offence) to a period of imprisonment to be served (wholly or partly) under the supervision of a parole officer, they might now be simply sentenced to a period of 12 months, wholly served in custody and then released back into the community without supervision or support. Thus, whilst the community might be protected for the 12 month period someone is imprisoned, when looked at long term, the outcome may well be worse. There will be more defendants, who might otherwise be diverted away from prison (towards rehabilitation or treatment) or supported to reintegrate into the community after a period of imprisonment, being released without such support.
30. The premise underlying these provisions is that imprisoning more people, and for longer periods, will increase safety in the community. Such a premise is unsupported by any evidence which the Association is aware of and is contrary to the experience of members who practice in the criminal law. Prisons play a role in community protection and (when administered appropriately) rehabilitation of offenders. The community is best protected by the rehabilitation of offenders. The rehabilitative process is best achieved by a combination of prison (if required) and support in the community. The nature of mandatory minimum sentencing is such that it is highly likely that the majority of offenders who are sentenced for sec. 29AA offending will receive the minimum term of 12 months, all served in custody. Such a sentence offers no assistance to the offender in the community. Whilst a combination of the sec. 29AA sentence and the substantive sentence for the offence committed in breach of bail might be appropriate in some cases (and thereby allow for supervision on release), it is likely that the effective sentence many people receive for the breach will be the minimum term. This is not a sentence structure that supports rehabilitation.

Double punishment

31. Proposed sec. 29AA(5) and (6) displace sec. 16 and sec. 17 of the *Criminal Code* and sec. 45 of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1954* (Qld), so that the rules against double punishment and double jeopardy do not bar a defendant being sentenced to at least that minimum term for the section 29AA offence, along with a separate penalty for the qualifying offence. This offends a long-standing principle of criminal law: a person should not be punished twice for the same conduct. That principle is reflected in section 34 of the *Human Rights Act 2019*.
32. The Association notes that in the Statement of Compatibility the Minister states that in her view, the introduction of the sec. 29AA offence “do[es] not limit the right not

to be punished more than once for an offence [...] despite displacing section 16 of the Criminal Code.”¹

33. An earlier iteration of sec. 29AA, introduced into the *Youth Justice Act* in 2014² was considered by the now President of the Children’s Court of Queensland in *R v S; R v L* [2015] QChC 3. Her Honour found that, “*pursuant to the provisions of s16 of the Criminal Code the child cannot be punished for the offence under s59A of the Youth Justice Act 1992*”. The Association notes that Her Honour’s analysis may well form the basis for an argument that the new offence provision is indeed inconsistent with section 34 of the *Human Rights Act*.

The breadth of the prescribed offences

34. The wide net cast by applying the law to all people on bail and the breadth of prescribed offences create great potential for injustice.
35. While all of the prescribed offences can be (and often are) very serious and involve objectively serious criminality, this is not always the case.
36. As in the example above, unlawful use of a motor vehicle can be committed by a person who merely agrees to be a passenger in a stolen car. Such conduct is to be condemned. However, the circumstances of such offending are often such that simply do not warrant the perpetrator being jailed - or jailed for a significant period of time.
37. Many of the prescribed offences are capable of being committed in a wide variety of circumstances, encompassing conduct with significantly differing levels of objective seriousness and moral culpability.
38. the explanatory note contends that the offence of breaching bail (by way of prescribed offence) is “*a distinct wrong against the administration of justice which is separate from the harm caused by the underlying crime*”. However, criminal punishment should have some proportionality to the objective criminality of the relevant offence. Twelve months imprisonment (wholly served) is not proportional to the subjective criminality involved in breaching bail, particularly when the breaching offence is relatively minor.
39. When relatively minor offending committed on bail can result in extensive prison terms, solely referable to a person’s bail status, the arbitrary nature of that outcome is apt to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, rather than enhance it.

¹ Statement of Compatibility, page 2

² *Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014*

Unintended consequences

40. There are likely to be many unintended consequences of provisions which carry such a (proportionally) hefty mandatory penalty and cover such a broad category of potential offenders and potential offending situations.
41. However, there is one consequence that does not appear – on the face of the Bill or the explanatory memorandum – to have been given appropriate consideration, namely the removal of any real incentive for a person charged with a sec. 29AA offence to plead guilty,
42. As noted *above*, the mandatory penalty leaves little scope for a judicial officer to afford a discount to offenders who admit their guilt. A great many defendants, who would otherwise have been likely to plead guilty and be sentenced, will contest their matters at trial. This phenomenon is widely observed when mandatory minimum sentence provisions are enacted. The simple logic is that, if a defendant is going to be sentenced to 12 months come what may, they might as well take their chance at a trial.
43. The inefficiencies in cost to the community, and time delays, were this to occur, are difficult to overstate. It is already the experience of barrister that the Magistrates Court (in particular) is overloaded with trial work. It is not uncommon for trials to not be heard on their listed day and subsequently adjourned, due to a lack of available Magistrates. This brings with it wasted costs in legal fees (often absorbed by the community through grants of Legal Aid), unnecessary stress for witnesses and victims and the risk that witness recollections will diminish due to delay. None of these things serve the community well.
44. Further, the increased trial load will likely be felt acutely by the Queensland Police Service. When a matter is listed for trial, investigating police are necessarily taken away from front line work to draft statements and compile briefs of evidence. This work is often not required when a defendant indicates an early guilty plea. With this in mind, one impact of the new provisions will likely be less police time devoted to front line work.
45. Delays in the criminal justice system have a flow on effect to civil proceedings. Proceedings between private citizens and companies in commercial matters, estates litigation, personal injury claims, insurance claims and all other civil proceedings will be delayed due to the consequences of this legislation. These include cases which are necessary for the delivery of necessary infrastructure all the way along the spectrum to cases which are deeply personal to the parties. For commerce to thrive in this state, investors, multinational companies and individuals *must* have confidence that there is an efficient legal system available to resolve disputes should they arise.

The confidence test

46. These provisions add a further hurdle towards obtaining bail for a defendant who is charged with a prescribed offence whilst on bail. The defendant will be required (as they would be in most cases under the current regime) to show cause why their detention pending trial would be unjustified. However, even if the defendant satisfied the judge or magistrate that their detention was **not justified**, the proposed sec.16AA (and its equivalent for children) will require that the defendant then satisfy the judge or magistrate “to a high degree of confidence” that they will not commit a further prescribed offence while released on bail.
47. As already noted, the current sec.16(3) of the *Bail Act* already provides that where a defendant is charged with an indictable offence (or with other specified offences) alleged to be committed on bail:

The Court or police officer shall refuse to grant bail unless the defendant shows cause why the defendant’s detention in custody is not justified and, if bail is granted or the defendant is released under s 11A, must include in the order a statement of reasons for granting bail or releasing the defendant

48. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases to which the new provisions apply, the presumption in favour of bail is already reversed. It is already the case that a defendant charged with an indictable offence alleged to have been committed on bail must satisfy the decision maker that, taking into account relevant matters such as the risk of further offending, their detention is not justified.
49. It must be remembered that the new provisions will apply to a person who has not been convicted or tried for the relevant breaching offence. They have simply been *charged*. They are presumed to be innocent. It is trite to say that the rule of law requires a civilised society to be slow to imprison citizens who have not been convicted of any offence. Again, that is not to say that there should never be occasions where a defendant, who is a demonstrated risk of further offending, should be denied bail. The current provisions recognise these situations and a defendant being denied bail is not an uncommon occurrence. However, the difficulty with the proposed provisions is that they appear to be designed to upset the balancing act that ordinarily applies when assessing risk in a show cause bail situation.
50. A defendant in an ordinary show cause bears the onus of demonstrating why they should be granted bail. However, the question posed to the decision maker is still one requiring a balancing of the risks involved with releasing a defendant against the undesirability of that defendant (presumed innocent) being detained. In this way, the authorities recognise that a significant factor in a show cause bail application is the strength of the Crown case. This is so because of the increasing

risk of injustice where a person who faces the most flimsy of allegations is denied bail because of them.

51. However, applying the new test, the strength of the Crown case will become irrelevant (or highly diminished in its relevance), to the new third limb. Proposed sec. 16AA(6) preserves the operation of sec. 16, so the strength of the evidence remains a consideration at that stage, but sec. 16AA(2) then directs the decision maker to a single question, whether the defendant has satisfied them to a high degree of confidence that no further qualifying offence will be committed. For children the point is put beyond doubt by proposed sec. 48AG(4) of the *Youth Justice Act*, which requires the decision maker to have regard *only* to matters relevant to the risk of the child committing a further significant offence.
52. A defendant could face a charge that appears, to the decision maker, to be founded on the most tenuous evidence, but they would be obliged to deny bail unless that defendant could prove they were not a risk of committing further offending. Removing other relevant factors and focusing purely on future risk, as these new provisions do, is tantamount to punishing a person for crimes they *might* commit in the future, rather than making a reasoned decision grounded in the objects of the *Bail Act*. It is for this reason that it appears to the Association that these provisions are susceptible to constitutional challenge, which is addressed under a separate heading below.
53. Further injustice arises from the “*high degree of confidence test*”, due to the inability for the decision maker to consider the time that has already been served by a defendant on remand, prior to the relevant bail application. In the ordinary show cause situation, an assessment can be made as to whether the defendant has already served more time on remand than they would likely receive as a sentence for the offences for which they are remanded. In the ordinary course, it would be unjustifiable to hold someone on remand for a charge for a longer period than they would receive as their sentence. The injustice in such a situation is obvious. However, this has no place in the new limb and, for children, proposed sec. 48G(4) of the *Youth Justice Act* excludes it in terms. On that limb it would not be relevant that a person had already served their time. Bail, under such a regime, mirrors arbitrary preventative detention more than a mechanism designed to ensure attendance of a defendant at trial and that they do not further offend whilst awaiting that trial.
54. The Association is aware of instances of adverse comment or challenges relating to similar provisions that have been implemented in other States or Territories.
55. In *R v RB* [2024] NSWSC 471, Lonergan J considering the equivalent “*high degree of confidence*” test in sec. 22C of the *Bail Act* 2013 (NSW), said:

The test – “a high degree of confidence” – is a test unknown to the criminal law. The test has significant potential to be unevenly applied, given the absence of any assistance as to what it means in the amending legislation or elsewhere.

56. These concerns seem, to the Association, to be well founded and apply with equal force to the provisions of the Bill.

Chapter III of the Constitution and constitutional validity

57. Section 7A(2AB) of the *Bail Act* 1982 (NT), inserted by the *Bail and Youth Justice Legislation Amendment Act* 2025 (NT), is the subject of a pending High Court challenge (D15/2025). That provision requires a court to refuse bail unless it has a high degree of confidence, “*when considered in isolation from matters mentioned in sections 24 and 24A*”, that the person will not commit a prescribed offence or a serious violence offence or otherwise endanger the safety of the community.
58. In *North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory of Australia*, the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (**NAAJA**) contends that the provision requires the court to authorise detention that is punitive, otherwise than in the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt, and that it thereby substantially impairs the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, the Local Court and the Youth Justice Court of the Northern Territory contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution, and is accordingly invalid.
59. The argument advanced would appear to transpose directly to proposed sec. 48AG of the *Youth Justice Act*, which contains the same isolating direction in sec. 48AG(4). It is less direct as to adults, because sec. 16AA contains no equivalent words and sec. 16AA(6) preserves the operation of sec. 16, though sec. 16AA(2) makes the new question determinative and, unlike the Northern Territory provision, casts the onus on the defendant.
60. The Association raises the constitutional question for good reasons: the *first* is that the High Court is due to hear argument on an equivalent Northern Territory provision. The *second* is that the answer is not obvious, and the Committee should not be told otherwise. The Association submits that the question is a real one, as is demonstrated by the referral of the matter to the Full Court of the High Court of Australia, and that the constitutional validity of such provisions will be illuminated by the decision in D15/2025. The Association submits that the Committee should not report on the Bill before the High Court has delivered judgment.

Impact on correctional and detention centres

61. The Association considers that a consequence which will necessarily follow from the adopting of the Bill is a general increase in the number of people (adults and children) incarcerated in Queensland. Indeed, to some extent this is an express purpose of the Bill. However, it is a notorious fact that prisons are already overcrowded. Cells designed for one occupant are being shared by two or more people. Children are being held in watch houses for prolonged periods.
62. Overcrowding in prisons is not a matter that goes only to the comfort of prisoners. Prisons should be places aimed at rehabilitation, as well as punishment. Services aimed at assisting rehabilitation such as classes and work programs are already hard to access. When courses and other rehabilitative programs are not available, this rehabilitative function is not discharged. Further, crowded prisons are more likely to lead to violence (both targeted at other prisoners and prison staff) including riots. Such conditions, again, are not conducive to rehabilitation. Without building new prisons before implementing these provisions it seems beyond question that the already difficult prison overcrowding issue will reach catastrophic levels. This will not assist in rehabilitating prisoners, nor will it present a safe environment for prison staff.
63. In this context, the Association notes the acknowledgment in the Statement of Compatibility that both the introduction of the sec. 29AA offence and the confidence test in relation to bail will affect the current capacity of prisons and detention centres. The Minister's acknowledgment that it is "*likely this will impact the conditions of detention, engaging the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty*" and "*may also engage the right to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment*" should raise concerns about the effect of the introduction of these measures on an already pressured system.

Override of the Human Rights Act

64. The Association notes that the Bill purports to extend the current override declarations in place with respect to the *Human Rights Act*. The Association notes that when this first occurred in 2023, with the introduction of the *Strengthening Community Safety Bill*, the following submissions were made at the public hearing of the Bill:

The Bar Association also opposes the amendments that are proposed. The greatest concern for the Bar Association is that this represents the first proposed use of section 43 of the Human Rights Act. That section recognises within its own wording that the suspension of the operation of that Act is a power that is exceptional and is only to be used by the parliament in exceptional circumstances.

The Association has grave concerns about the extent of the supposed crisis actually warranting the suspension of the operation of that act in the present circumstances [...]

The Bar Association is extremely concerned that the first time parliament is considering overriding the operation of the Human Rights Act is in relation to laws dealing with the custody and sentencing of children. Children, of course, have no meaningful way of participating and having their voices heard in the parliamentary process. They can only rely on the adults in the room. To suspend the Human Rights Act and its operation to ensure the ability of the executive to detain more children for longer is fundamentally contrary to what is known to work.

The creation of a breach of bail offence will only serve potentially to increase the numbers of children in detention. This, of course, is contrary to what the youth justice system and the Youth Justice Act are intended to achieve. The crisis in our watch houses is well known and has been referred to already. To increase the numbers of children in detention will only make an already deplorable situation even worse.³

65. The Association maintains those concerns, and its opposition to the introduction of measures inconsistent with the basic human rights of Queenslanders.

Conclusion

66. The Association is concerned that the Bill will have a profound impact on the administration of justice in this State. Consequences such as those on prison overcrowding are difficult to correct once they have begun. The Association would urge a reconsideration of these proposed changes so that, at the very least, the likely unintended consequences, such as prison overcrowding and an increased trial load, can be addressed.

Yours faithfully



Cate Heyworth-Smith KC
President

³ Mr James Benjamin, Barrister, page 6 of the Hansard of the *Public Hearing—Inquiry into the Strengthening Community Safety Bill 2023*