

Queensland Community Safety Bill 2024

Submission No: 76
Submitted by: Lawrence Lyons
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Submitter Comments:

15/05/2024

Re: Queensland Community Safety Bill 2024

Submission by: Lawrence Lyons

Professional standing to make comment:

Retired Queensland Police Officer 4040; Witness 51 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Police and Government Misconduct and Corruption (Fitzgerald Inquiry); Police Service Certificate Lead Investigator of Inquiry, Police Commissioner James O'Sullivan "[...] *loyal and dedicated service to the Community of Queensland* [...]"; Author "The Joke" (www.thejoke.com.au) Corruption in Queensland; Co-Author "National Defence Strategy - The Game of Go Vs. Chess by Alexandra Hunter" - An analysis of the work of Major General Andrew James Molan, AO, DSC, distinguished senior officer in the Australian Army, Australian politician, Rest in Peace, contents of the book "Danger On Our Doorstep" applicable considerations (sub elements) linked to the contents of today's Queensland Community Safety Bill 2024.

Key points of my submission:

The proposed bill you have provided contains a wide array of measures, ranging from changes in the court system to amendments in youth justice and traffic laws.

Comment about the fitness and propriety aspects related to firearm licenses specifically - challenging the practicality, effectiveness, and potential for unintended consequences of the proposed measures.

Reform the 'fit and proper person' test in the Weapons Act 1990 by expanding the types of serious offending captured:

Comment: While adding additional categories of serious offenses to disqualify persons from holding a firearm license may seem reasonable to ensure public safety, there is a risk of it being too broad or vague, potentially disqualifying individuals based on minor or irrelevant infractions that do not accurately reflect on their ability to responsibly handle a firearm.

Introducing a new category of disqualified persons:

Comment: This can be seen as an overreach if the new categories are not based on clear evidence linking the proposed disqualifications to risks associated with firearm ownership. Creating overly restrictive categories may also overwhelm the system with appeals and case reviews, reducing the efficiency of firearms licensing services.

Extending the exclusionary period to 10 years in certain circumstances:

Comment: A blanket extension of the exclusionary period might be excessive and could fail to take into account individual circumstances and evidence of rehabilitation. This "one size fits all" approach may unjustly affect individuals who have shown they are capable of being responsible firearms owners.

Introduce a verification process for purchasing small arms ammunition:

Comment: While it is important to regulate ammunition sales, requiring an extensive verification process could create administrative backlogs and could inconvenience legitimate license holders without significantly deterring individuals who are intent on obtaining ammunition through illicit means. One must consider the balance between public safety and the rights of lawful firearms owners. Any changes should be evidence-based, clearly defined, and should avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on law-abiding citizens while effectively addressing the risks posed by individuals who may misuse firearms.

Considerations related to national security:

In the book "Danger On Our Doorstep," the author, underscores a critical shift in modern warfare dynamics. The author articulates that, in contrast to bygone eras of large-scale conflicts where nations often had a grace period to mobilise and train their forces, contemporary scenarios may not afford such luxuries. The stark reality presented is that the window to enlist and adequately prepare new recruits could be **perilously short** [...]

National Defence Strategy - The Game of Go Vs. Chess by Alexandra Hunter .../



A sea of humanity driven by desperation and famine

National Defence Strategy for Australia: The Game of Go vs Chess

By Alexandra Hunter

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This work challenges every reader to consider the implications of inaction and the value of foresight—a reminder that amidst the currents of war refugees and the thunderous approach of the enemy, emerges a test: How will Australia, with its "One-Shot" military capability, innovate and adapt in the face of a transformative global crisis? The answer may shape the future of a nation.

INTRODUCTION



To thoroughly appreciate the geopolitical stakes at play, one must acknowledge that the spectre of nuclear confrontation is often wielded as a strategic lever to direct the conduct of governments, particularly those of democratic nations where the public's aversion to military casualties is a known vulnerability.

This calculus becomes particularly pertinent when analysing another nation's posture amidst rising threats. The nation's decision-making could be significantly influenced by the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear engagement, especially when such threats are leveraged by adversaries to exploit democratic sensitivities towards the loss of life.

In the example given below, we carry out a critical assessment of how these nuclear intimidations might influence responses of Asian nations to a hostile force moving south through their waters to Australia.

Delving into the Australian context, the situation grows more complex. Should unauthorised vessels penetrate the waters of northern Australia, the scenario posits a harrowing defence challenge for Australia, which may find its typical military responses beyond its territorial waters heavily curtailed by the looming threat of nuclear escalation.

The implications are grave; without the means to decisively counter the result is an unconventional invasion of Australia. Australia's national security policy would be sternly tested, necessitating a reliance on civilian support and strategic responses to prevent an escalation to nuclear conflict. It underscores the urgent necessity for Australia and its regional partners to innovate within their strategic frameworks, enhancing their deterrence and defence capabilities without triggering a nuclear crisis.

Major General Andrew James Molan, AO, DSC, served not only as a distinguished senior officer in the Australian Army but also made his mark as an Australian politician. In his insightful book "Danger On Our Doorstep," this military strategist conveys a sobering thesis: Australia possesses a "One-Shot" military might when juxtaposed with the vastly greater forces of potential adversaries.

If we engage in the kind of conflict that plays to the enemy's strengths, defeat becomes a likely scenario. The following narrative is but a fragment of a mosaic of strategic contemplations.

The fragment presented is that we face a threat of an unconventional invasion orchestrated by a foreign alliance, we will call "The Octopus".



Special operations herding war refugees south

The scenario unfolds with regional conflicts stretching across Europe and the Middle East, with Asia's turmoil following the invasion of Taiwan standing as the pivotal Pacific Ocean axis. This cascade of upheaval precipitates an exodus of unprecedented proportions: tens of millions of war refugees from the greater Asian region, a sea of humanity driven by desperation and famine, among them groups that are both armed and organised by a foreign coalition.

This alliance employs military precision, with the navy and air force of the enigmatic entity known as the Octopus, herding ships towards Australian territorial waters. From there begins a maritime odyssey towards Darwin Harbour and beyond, as a flotilla of vessels—vast and varied in size—descends upon Australia's shores. This armada, unrelenting in number and need, converges along the Australian coast, presenting a challenge of not only humanitarian scale but also of national security significance.



Tens of millions

We begin our analysis by examine the game of Go from a warfare perspective. In the game of Go, the objective is to surround as much territory as possible to attain overall control of the board. Every move plays a part in shaping the larger strategy of the game.

In contrast, chess is a tactical manoeuvring game that ultimately captures the opponent's pieces to checkmate the king. Each game requires a different approach and mentality.

Overall, the use of war refugees to conceal armed and organised groups highlights the complexity and ingenuity of modern warfare tactics. By leveraging the vulnerability and desperation of displaced individuals, these insurgents are able to manipulate the situation to their advantage and further their own interests, ultimately leading to a more challenging and nuanced battlefield for those tasked with countering such threats.



Entering the coastal rainforests of Queensland

In contrast, the game of chess requires a more direct and aggressive approach to achieving victory. In this analogy, one could equate the use of war refugees to conceal armed groups as a strategic manoeuvre akin to sacrificing a pawn to gain a tactical advantage. By sacrificing the safety and well-being of war refugees, these armed insurgents are able to enter Australia, even if it means putting refugees at risk.

Military drones are deployed from cargo ships to support armed groups navigating through the rainforest. These drones are equipped to drop supplies at prearranged coordinates, providing crucial assistance to the groups on the ground.



Military air drops using drones

By leveraging this technology, the armed groups can operate more efficiently and effectively, maximising their chances of success in their mission. Additionally, the use of military drones minimises the risk of exposing logistical operations to potential adversaries, further enhancing the security and success of the mission.

Overall, this strategy illustrates a sophisticated and coordinated approach to supporting armed groups in challenging environments.

As Australia faces an increasingly complex and interconnected global security environment, we must understand the nuances of these two games and apply their strategic lessons to our national defence strategy.

KEY PRINCIPLES



Flexibility and Adaptability: Understanding that our adversaries may play the game of Go, where they seek to expand their influence gradually, we must be flexible in our responses and adapt our strategies accordingly. We must be prepared to counter and anticipate their next moves to stay ahead of the game.

Alliance Building: Like chess, where the pieces work together to protect the king, we must strengthen our alliances and partnerships with like-minded nations to enhance our collective security posture. By building a solid network of partnerships, we can create a united front against any potential threats.

Strategic Depth: In the game of Go, players often create territorial frameworks to secure their positions and gain strategic depth. Similarly, in our defence strategy, we must build a robust defence infrastructure and capabilities to ensure that we have the depth and resilience to withstand any adversary's attacks.

Intelligence and Information Dominance: In chess, where players seek to gather intelligence about their opponent's moves, we must prioritise intelligence gathering and information dominance to stay one step ahead of our adversaries. By enhancing our strategic intelligence capabilities, we can better anticipate and counter potential threats.

Technology and Innovation: In both games, players constantly innovate and adapt their strategies to outsmart their opponents. We must invest in cutting-edge technology and innovation to maintain our technological edge and deter potential adversaries from challenging our security interests.

ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS



To effectively navigate Australia's complex security challenges, it is crucial to consider a series of key questions that can shape our strategic responses and preparedness. By delving into these inquiries, we can gain valuable insights into potential scenarios and make informed decisions to safeguard our national interests.

The population of Greater Asia is approximately 4.64 billion in 2021, encompassing countries in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and parts of Central Asia. If we consider the numerical value of 1 to 5 percent of this population, we are looking at a range of 46.4 million to 232 million individuals. Given the possibility of a large-scale conflict resulting in the displacement of war refugees, with estimates ranging from 40 to 200 million individuals from the Greater Asia region, the potential impact and challenges are significant.

In scenarios involving human shields as a strategy, where large numbers of vessels carrying war refugees are used to conceal armed forces. These vessels are likely to be reused within a short period to effectively place armed forces on Australian shores. Vessels protected by the Octopus' naval and air forces, employing the propaganda of humanitarian special operations.

Historical example of armies using human shields to disguise their approach dates back to the ancient world.

The Roman commander and general, Quintus Sertorius, used this tactic during the Sertorian War (80-72 BC) in Hispania (modern-day Iberian Peninsula). Sertorius recruited local tribesmen and peasants, often women and children, to march alongside his troops as they approached enemy positions. The human shields created confusion and hesitancy among the enemy forces, allowing Sertorius to gain strategic advantages.

Another example occurred during World War II when German forces famously used civilians as human shields in various cities, including Stalingrad and Berlin. Hitler's strategy was to place civilian populations in strategic locations during battles to deter Allied forces from launching attacks. The presence of civilians made it difficult for the Allies to bomb or attack German positions without causing significant civilian casualties.

These historical examples illustrate how the use of human shields has been employed as a tactical strategy by military commanders throughout history to protect their own forces or gain a strategic advantage over the enemy. This knowledge can inform our strategic planning and resource allocation in response to various security threats and scenarios.

Key questions:

Would the threat of nuclear weapons against Indonesia and other nations by the Octopus serve as a deterrent to prevent them from engaging the naval escort orchestrated by the Octopus for transporting millions to Australia?

Assessing the potential role of nuclear threats in shaping Indonesia's actions is critical for evaluating the feasibility of countering threats to maritime security in the region. By considering the implications of nuclear capabilities on geopolitical dynamics, we can better anticipate and address security challenges in the South Pacific.

What are the implications if we lack the capacity to control the invasion, unable to inspect the vessels long before they arrive in Australian waters, especially when military options are constrained due to the threat of nuclear conflict?

The screenshot below from SOFREP (Military Grade Content) illustrates that secret missile platforms can be hidden in shipping containers and other spaces of cargo ships, small ships, and large fishing boats disguised as vessels transporting refugees under the protection of the humanitarian special operations naval and air force. The public's aversion to massive refugee casualties is an advantage to an enemy playing a shell game.



Screen capture from included YouTube video

Examining the scenario where conventional military responses are limited underscores the importance of alternative defence strategies and preparedness measures once the enemy reveals themselves. Understanding the potential consequences of inadequate defence capabilities can guide us in developing adaptive and resilient responses to mitigate risks and protect national sovereignty.

The risk of making assumptions:

Drawing lessons from history, did the United Kingdom effectively protect Singapore during World War II?

The United Kingdom, which then controlled Singapore as a key military base in Southeast Asia, failed to effectively protect the city from Japanese forces. The fall of Singapore in 1942 was a significant blow to British and Allied forces, highlighting the importance of strategic fortification, preparedness, and robust defence capabilities.

How might a conflict over Taiwan impact the strategic posture of the United States in the Pacific region, potentially leading to a strategic retreat to Hawaii. Is the assumption that the United States will not retreat the cornerstone of our current national defence strategy?

Analysing historical precedents, such as the fall of Singapore, offers valuable insights into the importance of strategic fortification and interstate alliances in preserving national security.

By exploring these key questions and expanding upon their implications, we can enhance our strategic foresight, readiness, and decision-making processes to effectively address emerging security challenges and protect Australia's interests in an increasingly complex and interconnected global landscape.

While the assumption that the United States will not strategically retreat may inform current defence policies, it is essential for Australia to recognise the uncertainties and complexities in the strategic environment. By conducting thorough risk assessments and scenario planning, Australia can better prepare for contingencies, strengthen defence capabilities, and enhance collaboration with allies in the region.

Some studies suggest that a military conflict over Taiwan could lead to heavy losses for the United States due to the complexities of the region, the advanced capabilities of the invader, and the potential for escalation to a broader conflict. Factors such as the geographic proximity of Taiwan to their enemy, the presence of sophisticated anti-access/area denial capabilities, and the sheer size and scale of the invasion force are all considerations that could impact the outcome of the conflict.

The book "Danger On Our Doorstep" presents a sobering thesis: the invasion of Taiwan will differ significantly from D-Day in Normandy. The author highlights that the invasion plan will prioritise a preemptive strike on United States and its alliance partners' naval and air assets in the Pacific before advancing towards Taiwan.

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: WAR AND DECEPTION - THE OBJECTIVE OF AVOIDANCE AND READINESS



As history has demonstrated, warfare is often characterised by deception. Utilising this principle, Australia must adopt a multifaceted strategy to counter the threat of invasion. The ultimate objective of this plan is to actively work towards avoiding invasion while simultaneously being fully prepared to defend the nation if necessary.

Instead of relying substantially on external military assistance and the purchase of high-tech military hardware from other countries, Australia should harness its internal resources and capabilities, leveraging the expertise of farmers, pastoralists, indigenous communities, target sports clubs, truck and rail operators, civilian UHF, VHF and HF radio networks, construction trade networks, and military resources hidden throughout the country.

To enhance Australia's defence resilience in the event of an invasion, the following strategies will complement and expand upon the utilisation of domestic resources and expertise already noted in the current national defence plan provided these things are done prior to an invasion:

Comprehensive Civil Defence Training: Implement widespread training initiatives to ready civilians for auxiliary roles in national defence, incorporating general military preparedness for emergent situations.

Augmenting Reserve Forces utilising the Sub-Group from the Target Sports Clubs: Broaden the capacity and provisioning of reserve units to ensure a seamless transition of civilians into a mobilised military force when required.

Advancing Local Defence Production: Strategic investments in domestic defence manufacturing for critical technology and equipment to foster self-reliance and innovation.

Bolstering Cybersecurity Measures from the Perspective of Low-Tech Civil Communications: Enhance defences against digital threats by establishing formidable cyber defence systems and recruiting a civilian cyber task force from within the tech community.

Robust Intelligence Gathering (Training Civilians that will be in Occupied Areas): Invest in expanding reconnaissance capabilities, leveraging technology such as satellites and drones to gather vital intelligence.

Fortifying Maritime and Border Controls: Develop a thorough strategy to safeguard coastlines and frontiers, utilising a combination of patrol vessels and advanced surveillance systems.

Strategic Reserves and Supply Chain Mastery (Utilising Civilians): Establish stockpiles of essential resources, such as medical supplies and fuels, and orchestrate a resilient logistics framework for distribution under duress.

Infrastructure Security and Recovery Planning: Strengthen key infrastructure against assaults and devise rapid reconstruction and recovery protocols.

Public Civil Defence Instruction: Introduce a national program to educate the populace on survival techniques, emergency protocols, and communal support during crises.

Pursuing Energy Independence: Invest in the advancement and deployment of sustainable energy systems to curtail reliance on vulnerable fuel supplies.

Global Diplomacy and Collaboration: Reinforce international alliances and foster intelligence partnerships that offer support and vital information during conflict.

Local Empowerment and Relief Networks: Establish and support local network initiatives aimed at providing relief and assistance to citizens in times of national stress.

Taken together, these measures present a strategic matrix of defence priorities to reinforce Australia's capacity to respond autonomously and effectively to potential threats.

In 2021, Australia boasted a significant number of firearms license holders, representing approximately 6% of the population equating to almost 700,000 people. The nation also has a considerable workforce of large truck operators, totalling around 215,000. In addition, we have an extensive agricultural sector with about 85,000 businesses employing over 300,000 individuals. Additionally, the latest funding estimates for defence is about A\$54 billion by 2030.

To allocate resources strategically, Australia should prioritise investing a significant percentage of the defence budget in strengthening domestic defence capabilities.

This involves dividing resources into two categories: low-tech defensive technologies and strategies that invest in the Australian people and high-tech resources aimed at countering space-based surveillance by the Octopus and strengthening our naval and air force.

The proposed National Self-Defence Preservation Act 2024 empowers the Prime Minister to delete firearm ownership registers in the face of an imminent invasion, safeguarding Australians' right to resist and defend themselves.

There is a large subgroup of almost 700,000 target sports enthusiasts who play a crucial role in the defence of Australia. Why is this group so critical to the national defence strategy?

In the book "Danger On Our Doorstep," the author, underscores a critical shift in modern warfare dynamics. The author articulates that, in contrast to bygone eras of large-scale conflicts where nations often had a grace period to mobilise and train their forces, contemporary scenarios may not afford such luxuries.

The stark reality presented is that the window to enlist and adequately prepare new recruits could be perilously short, posing significant challenges to national readiness and response. A thought-provoking facet is the presence of a subgroup within the target sports and hunting community comprising active and retired personnel with backgrounds in police and military service.

This diverse yet cohesive collective is strategically dispersed across Australia's expansive territory, resembling a decentralised reserve of military trainers, many of whom possess firsthand warfare experience. The concept of utilising decentralised networks of skilled individuals for defence purposes has been demonstrated in various historical contexts, such as partisan resistance movements in World War II utilising irregular warfare tactics.

Target sports clubs, with their solid structure and vast networking capabilities, have the potential to rapidly evolve into a powerful resistance force. This cost-effective strategy enables volunteers to play a crucial role as a third tier of our defence force without the exorbitant costs often linked to traditional reserves, operating under the stipulation of "only on Australian soil." By empowering target sports clubs to function as a key component of our defence force, we enhance our readiness and promote a spirit of unity and cooperation. This proactive stance ensures that we are better prepared to confront any obstacles that may arise.



We will walk with you once more

Leveraging their expertise in tactical training and discipline, veterans within the sporting shooters group could seamlessly assume leadership roles within a potent homeland resistance force. This would enable them to counter a potential threat posed by a clandestine armed force emerging from a surge of war refugees moving south, backed by the Octopus' significant naval and air force.



Sporting Shooters Become Resistance Fighters in Occupied North Queensland slowing advance south, Army prepares for war on the Brisbane line.

Strategic assets within occupied territories

This strategy allows the Australian armed forces to prioritise their efforts on confronting the enemy ground, naval and air forces, especially considering the numerical advantage held by the opposing side.

This Australian resistance force managed by the armed forces of Australia would be reminiscent of the legendary French and Polish underground that arose during the Second World War, which proved to be both a strategic asset within the occupied areas in the following areas:

Espionage and Intelligence Gathering: They provided critical intelligence to the Allies, including information on German defences on the Normandy coast, which aided the D-Day invasion. **Sabotage:** Resistance fighters targeted railways, factories, and other infrastructure to disrupt the German war effort.

Guerrilla Warfare and Attacks: They conducted attacks on German troops and supply lines. **Escaping Networks:** Facilitated the escape of Allied soldiers and downed airmen from occupied territory. **Propaganda:** Printed and distributed newspapers and leaflets to keep the spirit of resistance alive and inform the public of the truth of the war situation, countering German and Vichy propaganda.

In light of the government's ongoing efforts to construct a national database, it is prudent to reflect on historical precedents, particularly as they pertain to the domain of cybersecurity. Drawing lessons from the initial obstacles faced by the French Resistance and the Polish Underground State during the early stages of World War II, it is evident that centralised repositories of sensitive information can become liabilities.

These groups, while instrumental in disrupting the Axis powers' strategic operations, experienced substantial impediments due to intelligence breaches. Under occupation, the enemy's access to comprehensive records on armed citizens significantly undermined the resistors' capacity for stealth and efficiency.

Given this historical context, and acknowledging the multi-faceted nature of modern conflict, where cyber threats such as hacking pose significant risks, the planned Australian national database demands careful consideration.

It potentially houses details on personnel who might constitute an Australian resistance force—a trove of information that, if compromised, could replicate the intelligence setbacks of the past. Therefore, while the database serves a valid function under normal circumstances, it is imperative that robust legislation be implemented to facilitate the expeditious deletion of sensitive datasets in the event of an imminent invasion. This legislative safeguard should be designed to remain dormant, activating only upon the recognition of a verified threat.

Such a precautionary measure would ensure that the database's existence does not impact civilian firearm ownership rights during peacetime, nor would it interfere with domestic policies. Rather, it would stand as a silent sentinel, guarding against the exploitation of centralised intelligence, and by extension, fortifying the nation's cyber and physical defences in the face of emergent crises.

Coordination and integration among various sectors, including government agencies, law enforcement, military forces, and civilian groups, are essential to ensure a unified front against the potential unconventional invasion orchestrated by the Octopus.

THE PLAN



In implementing the defence strategy, Australia can adopt low-tech defensive measures such as funding farmers, pastoralists, indigenous communities, trades people, and others to construct concealed and mostly fortified storage facilities and bunkers across the country. These sites can hide advanced military equipment and supplies, including tanks, jump-jets, helicopters, shallow water vessels, fuel, ammunition, water, and food.

Truck and rail operators can be incentivised to transport materials in covert manners, such as concealing resources in shipping containers. The use of false transports can confuse the enemy regarding the actual locations of resource. We, too, can play a shell game.

By embracing the principles of war, including deception, coordination, and resource utilisation, Australia can effectively mitigate the risks posed by the unconventional threat of the Octopus. This proactive and comprehensive approach will enhance the nation's ability to protect its sovereignty and security interests in the face of potential invasion while actively working towards avoiding it through strategic preparedness and deterrence.

The plan seeks to maintain a state of readiness that serves as a strong deterrent to any potential aggression while also ensuring that Australia is fully equipped to defend itself effectively if the need arises.

By harnessing the nation's internal resources and capabilities, including the expertise of farmers, pastoralists, indigenous communities, target sports clubs, truck drivers' networks, others, and hidden reserves scattered throughout the country, Australia aims to strengthen its domestic defence capabilities. This approach not only enhances self-reliance but also empowers local communities to contribute to the national security effort.

Australia possesses a solid foundation for mobilising resources in the face of adversity. Investing a substantial portion of the GDP in defence infrastructure and technology while prioritising low-tech that sustains the economy, the balance of funding into high-tech resource allocation then bolsters the nation's resilience against an invasion.

The proposed National Self-Defence Preservation Act 2024 underscores the importance of safeguarding Australians' right to protect themselves in times of crisis. By empowering the Prime Minister to take decisive actions, including deleting firearm ownership registers in the event of an imminent invasion, the legislation reinforces the nation's commitment to individual and collective security.

The National Self-Defence Preservation Act of 2024 serves as a declarative bill underscoring our sovereign right to self-defence. It unequivocally signals to potential aggressors that not only our military but also the citizenry stand ready to protect and resist any encroachments upon our nation's integrity.

Effective coordination and integration among government agencies, law enforcement, military forces, and civilian groups are essential to ensure a cohesive and unified response to any potential invasion orchestrated by the Octopus. This collaborative approach maximises the effectiveness of defence efforts and fosters a strong national defence posture.

In implementing the defence strategy, Australia will employ a range of tactics, including the construction of bunker storage areas on farmers', pastoralists' and indigenous' land, covert transportation of essential materials by truck and rail operators, and the deployment of deceptive measures to confuse potential adversaries. These proactive measures aim to both deter aggression and enhance Australia's ability to defend itself in the event of an invasion.

By strategically blending deception, preparedness, and deterrence, Australia can navigate the complexities of modern security challenges and uphold its sovereignty in the face of potential threats. This forward-looking approach prioritises avoidance of conflict while ensuring robust defence capabilities to safeguard the nation's interests and security.

CREATING A WAR ECONOMY



In the face of evolving security threats and potential unconventional invasions, Australia must adopt a strategic approach that prioritises the utilisation of domestic resources and capabilities to bolster its defence capabilities. One of the key considerations is the establishment of a war economy that empowers the Australian people to contribute actively to the nation's security.

This strategy presents a more sustainable and dependable course of action than placing predominant reliance on external military support or presuming the United States will be available and unencumbered by other global conflicts. It also steers clear of concentrating all our investments into costly high-tech military solutions from the US defence sector, thereby fostering a more self-reliant and robust defence posture. By harnessing the expertise and resources of Australians, including farmers, pastoralists, indigenous communities, target sports clubs, transport operators, trades people, and other essential sectors, Australia can build a resilient defence infrastructure that is rooted in community strength and self-reliance.

Investing in low-tech defensive technologies strengthens our national defence capabilities and ensures that local communities actively safeguard the country's security. Under the grey hair of veterans from local RSLs is a nation's military brain power. **Lest we forget that!**



Combat experience - unique perspective

One reason why experience trumps a university education in warfare is that veteran military members have real-life combat experience, which cannot be learned in a classroom setting. They have witnessed the realities of warfare, made split-second decisions under extreme pressure, and developed tactics based on trial and error.

This hands-on experience gives them a unique perspective and practical knowledge that cannot be gained solely through academic study. Furthermore, veterans have a deep understanding of military culture, hierarchy, and strategy that cannot be fully grasped without actually serving in the armed forces. They have lived and breathed the military environment, allowing them to have a more intuitive understanding of how to navigate complex battlefield scenarios and lead troops effectively.

Additionally, veterans have honed their skills through years of training, practice, and on-the-ground experience. They have developed a keen instinct for danger and know how to adapt too rapidly changing situations in the heat of battle. This level of expertise is invaluable in warfare, where split-second decisions can mean the difference between life and death.

Overall, while a university education can provide a theoretical foundation in warfare, nothing can compare to the practical knowledge and expertise that veterans bring to the table. Their experience is a vital resource that should not be underestimated or forgotten in the realm of military strategy and planning.

As such, it is imperative that our defence budget allocate resources for RSLs to establish an advisory program aimed at enhancing field operations coordination with the third tier of our defence force, specifically targeting the armed civilians operating in occupied territories.

Empowering Australian citizens to contribute to the war economy not only enhances our self-sufficiency but also fosters a sense of national unity and shared responsibility for our collective security. By distributing resources and responsibilities among the population, we create a more inclusive and robust defence framework that can effectively respond to diverse threats and challenges.

Balancing the allocation of resources between high-tech military options and grassroots initiatives within the war economy ensures a comprehensive and adaptable defence strategy. While advanced technologies have their place in modern warfare, investing in the skills, knowledge, and infrastructure of ordinary Australians enhances our ability to defend against unconventional threats and maintain a strong deterrent posture.

CONCLUSION



Embracing a war economy that empowers Australians to contribute to national defence efforts is a prudent and sustainable approach to safeguarding Australia's sovereignty and security.

By leveraging domestic resources, fostering community involvement, and prioritising grassroots initiatives, we can build a resilient and adaptive defence framework that reflects the strength and resilience of the Australian people. This inclusive and collaborative approach enhances our defence capabilities and reinforces our national unity and preparedness in the face of an unconventional invasion.

RIGHT TO RESIST BILL



Australia 31-Mar-2024, the intent of the following is to engage in broad-based advocacy with the aim of securing bipartisan support to bolster and uphold the safety and security of our nation.

The Role of Political Sponsorship in Australian Legislative Processes: Understanding Explanatory Memoranda

In Australian legislative processes, it is quite common for politicians to sponsor or endorse various materials including explanatory memoranda. An explanatory memorandum (EM) typically accompanies a bill in Parliament and provides a detailed explanation of the bill's purpose and its clauses. It is designed to enhance the understanding of the legislation for both parliamentarians and the public. Australian Members of Parliament (MPs), Senators, or even government Ministers might sponsor an explanatory memorandum as part of the process of introducing a bill.

This sponsorship does not necessarily mean that they are providing financial backing but rather lending their support to the advancement of the bill through the necessary legislative processes.

Short Title of Proposed Bill:

Safeguarding Australians' Right to Resist Foreign Invasion

Explanatory Memorandum (EM):

This legislative amendment to the existing National Emergency Legislation draws critical historical lessons from the experiences of occupied nations during World War II, specifically the actions of resistant movements in countries such as France and Poland. Throughout the conflict, invading forces systematically utilised local police registries to confiscate weapons and suppress potential resistance by identifying firearm owners. The proposed provision thus aims to empower the Prime Minister, under the strict and grave circumstance of an impending foreign invasion, to direct Police Commissioners to securely expunge firearm ownership registers.

This pre-emptive measure is predicated upon historical evidence showing that access to such registries compromised the safety of resistance members and, by extension, national security.

The effectiveness of resistance movements during World War II—such as the French Resistance and Polish Underground State—was instrumental in undermining Axis powers' strategic operations, despite their initial setbacks due to compromised intelligence.

In both cases, the persistence and eventual success of these movements hinged upon their ability to operate clandestinely, which was severely hindered when occupation forces had access to detailed records of armed citizens.

By removing the possibility of such a vulnerability, this amendment seeks to preserve the capacity for civilian-based defence without tampering with current firearms policies. Emulation of the resolve and strategies employed by World War II resistance fighters underpins the rationale for this provision, ensuring that, if ever necessary, Australian citizens are not pre-emptively disadvantaged in their ability to resist foreign occupation.

This precautionary measure ensures the protection of citizens' ability to resist occupation forces, without altering current national security and firearm ownership policies under normal circumstances. This legislation is essential for national security. It remains inactive unless a specific, recognised threat emerges, thereby having no impact on domestic policies or firearm ownership rights under standard conditions.

Full Title of Draft Bill:

**"National Self-Defence Preservation Act 2024:
Safeguarding Australians' Right to Resist Foreign
Invasion"**

An Act to amend the National Emergency Legislation to empower the Prime Minister to direct the deletion of firearm ownership registers in the event of an imminent threat of foreign invasion.

Preamble:

WHEREAS the security of the nation is of paramount importance; AND WHEREAS the historical precedent has shown that during times of occupation, information on firearm ownership can be used against the interests of the nation; AND WHEREAS it is imperative to maintain the capability of Australian citizens to defend themselves under extraordinary circumstances;

BE IT ENACTED by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Representatives of Australia, as follows:

Section 1: Short Title This Act may be cited as the "National Self-Defence Preservation Act 2024: Safeguarding Australians' Right to Resist Foreign Invasion".

Section 2: Definitions 'Imminent threat of foreign invasion' shall be defined in accordance with parameters set out in Schedule A of this Act; 'Prime Minister' refers to the serving Prime Minister of Australia; 'Police Commissioners' include the chief police officer of each Australian state and territory.

Section 3: Authority to Direct Deletion of Firearm Registers (1) In the event of an imminent threat of foreign invasion, as defined in Section 2, the Prime Minister shall have the authority to direct Police Commissioners to securely and permanently delete all firearm ownership registers under their control. (2) This section applies notwithstanding any other Act or law.

Section 4: Conditions of Activation (1) Activation of Section 3 of this Act requires a declaration of an ‘imminent threat of foreign invasion’ to be agreed upon by a bipartisan National Security Committee. (2) The specific process and criteria for determining an ‘imminent threat of foreign invasion’ are laid out in Schedule A of this Act.

Section 5: Duration of Deletion Directive Directive given under Section 3 shall remain effective until: (a) the Prime Minister revokes the directive per the cessation of the imminent threat; or (b) a period defined in Schedule B after the issuance of the directive elapses without renewal.

Section 6: Safeguard Procedures and Oversight Specific safeguard procedures for the secure deletion of records and post-action oversight will be prescribed in Schedule C of this Act.

****Section 7: No Impact on Existing Firearms Legislation** This Act shall not impact existing firearms legislation, regulations, or policies except as expressly provided for in Section 3 of this Act.

Section 8: Commencement This Act commences on the day after it receives the Royal Assent.

Section 9: Schedules The Schedules to this Act shall form part of this Act. Should there be any inconsistencies between the Schedules and the preceding sections, the provisions of the sections shall prevail.

SCHEDULE A Criteria for Determining an Imminent Threat of Foreign Invasion

SCHEDULE B Period of Effectiveness for Deletion Directive

SCHEDULE C Procedures for Secure Deletion of Records and Oversight Mechanisms

REFERENCE MATERIAL



Australian National Emergency Legislation

The term "Australian National Emergency Legislation" can refer to a variety of laws designed to grant certain powers to the Australian government, its states, and territories in times of national crisis, such as natural disasters, pandemics, or significant threats to national security, like a foreign invasion.

In essence, this kind of legislation typically outlines the powers and mechanisms through which the government can act rapidly and decisively to protect its citizens and infrastructure during extraordinary circumstances. These powers may include things like:

Allocating or redirecting funds and resources to areas and services that need them the most.

Implementing national security measures including surveillance, control of movement, or military deployment both domestically and internationally.

Enabling the swift acquisition or control of land and other assets that are necessary for dealing with the emergency.

Granting the ability to modify or set aside existing laws or regulations that might impede effective crisis management.

One notable example of emergency powers in Australia is the Biosecurity Act 2015, which allows the government to take actions to prevent or control the spread of diseases and pests that may affect human, animal, or plant health.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia, similar to many countries, used emergency powers to restrict travel, enforce quarantine measures, and lock down areas to prevent the spread of the virus. States and territories also have their own specific emergency management laws and can impose their own restrictions pertinent to the crisis at hand.

To deploy such sweeping powers, Australian legislation usually provides for checks and balances, including time limits on how long the powers can be active and parliamentary scrutiny of the actions taken under them.

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Resistance Movements during the Second World War

Reliance on Hunting Rifles and Shotguns: Many resistance movements throughout history, particularly during World War II, relied on whatever weapons they could acquire, including civilian guns, due to the difficulty of obtaining military-grade weapons or the need to maintain a low profile.

Improvised Weaponry: Resistance fighters often had to make do with what was available, including firearms originally made for civilians, like hunting rifles and shotguns.

Covert Supply and Smuggling: Sometimes, resistance groups would be supplied with weapons covertly by sympathetic governments or organisations. These could include both civilian and military firearms.

Capture and Modification: Resistance fighters would capture enemy weapons, use them, and at times modify civilian firearms to make them more effective for combat or sabotage operations.

In their struggles, resistance movements in various countries would use stealth, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics rather than engaging in direct open warfare, which would necessitate different types of armaments, including civilian weapons.

The French Resistance:

The French Resistance refers to the collection of French movements that fought against the Nazi German occupation of France and against the collaborationist Vichy régime during the Second World War. Resistance cells were spread throughout the country and were remarkably diverse, encompassing ideologies and members from a broad social and political spectrum, including communists, anarchists, socialists, conservatives, monarchists, liberals, and nationalists.

The actions of the French Resistance included:

Espionage and Intelligence Gathering: They provided critical intelligence to the Allies, including information on German defences on the Normandy coast, which aided the D-Day invasion.

Sabotage: Resistance fighters targeted railways, factories, and other infrastructure to disrupt the German war effort.

Guerrilla Warfare and Attacks: They conducted attacks on German troops and supply lines.

Escaping Networks: Facilitated the escape of Allied soldiers and downed airmen from occupied territory.

Propaganda: Printed and distributed newspapers and leaflets to keep the spirit of resistance alive and inform the public of the truth of the war situation, countering German and Vichy propaganda.

The Polish Resistance:

The Polish resistance is often associated with the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), which was loyal to the Polish government-in-exile and was one of the largest underground resistance movements in Europe.

Notable aspects of the Polish resistance included:

Siege of Warsaw: The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, a significant operation by the Polish resistance Home Army to liberate Warsaw from Nazi German occupation, was one of the most significant and tragic episodes in the history of the Polish resistance. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the bravery and determination of the Polish fighters made a powerful statement.

Intelligence Contributions: The Polish resistance provided crucial intelligence to the Allies, including early information about the Holocaust and German military technology such as the V-2 rocket.

Zegota: This was a council established to aid Jewish people, and it was unique in occupied Europe as it was an underground committee to aid Jews.

Assassination Operations: Among their operations was the successful assassination of Franz Kutschera, the SS and Police Leader of Warsaw.

The resistance movements in France and Poland during World War II consisted of a diverse range of clandestine activities that were instrumental in contributing to the Allied war effort. These movements were complex, encompassing a wide array of strategies and tactics, and they showcased considerable bravery and resourcefulness in the face of powerful enemy forces.

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